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# THE JOURNAL OF BIBLE AND RELIGION

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# THE JOURNAL OF BIBLE AND RELIGION

Vol. XXVIII

October, 1960

No. 4

## God Does Not Play Dice

Einstein and Religion

WALTER E. STUERMANN\*

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WRITING about Xenophon's description of Socrates, Bertrand Russell said that "a stupid man's report of what a clever man says is never accurate, because he unconsciously translates what he hears into something that he can understand."<sup>1</sup> There is no occasion for begging excuse from this indictment as we attempt to characterize the Jew of Copernican stature, whose mind was the fulcrum upon which the universe took an unexpected turn and revealed a hidden portion of itself never before seized by the human mind.

In the 1905 *Year Book of Physics*, Albert Einstein, at that time an examiner in the Swiss patent office in Bern, published several articles on different subjects. One had the title, "On the Electrodynamics of Bodies in Movement." It was distinguished by the fact that it quoted no other experts—the writer himself spoke with authority. This was the unpretentious birth of the special theory of relativity. There was no immediate, widespread acclaim, although this small paper spoke of the Archimedean point by which the universe was moved. Later, upon examining the paper, a Polish professor at the University of Cracow exclaimed, "A new Copernicus has been born!"

A second of the *Year Book* essays dealt

with the photoelectric effect, that is, with the quantum law for the emission and absorption of light. Einstein received the 1922 Nobel Prize for this research, and by it he contributed to quantum mechanics, from which interpretation of the universe he later departed and discovered himself opposing the greater number of his scientific contemporaries. A third of his 1905 articles introduced, under the auspices of the formula,  $E = mc^2$ , considerations which were to lead to the release of atomic energy forty years later. Max Born has said that the 1905 *Year Book* is "one of the most remarkable volumes in the whole of scientific literature."<sup>2</sup> Einstein made it so.

The physicist was born in 1879 in Bavaria. His early life was spent in Munich. His father was a free thinker of Jewish ancestry who was a partner in an electrochemical company. No religious ceremonies were observed in the Einstein home. While suffering under what he thought were the coercive procedures of the schools, young Einstein early acquired an interest in mathematics. Not without some difficulties, he entered and graduated from the Swiss Polytechnic School in Zurich, meanwhile having renounced both German citizenship and any official ties with Judaism. After graduation, he finally secured a position as a patent examiner in Bern (1902). While tending to this "shoemaker's job," he pursued his research in theoretical physics on the side. When recognition began to come his way, he moved into the universities in various professorial and lecturing ca-

\*DR. STUERMANN is professor of philosophy and religion at the University of Tulsa. His articles have appeared in *Interpretation: A Journal of Bible and Theology*, *ETC.: A Review of General Semantics*, and the *American Mathematical Monthly*.

pacities. On the application form for the post at Prague, he recorded his religious affiliation as "Mosaic," though this was evidently a concession to the formal application requirements of the state.

In 1914 Einstein accepted a research post with the Royal Prussian Academy of Science in Berlin. The year 1915 saw the publication of a famous paper which set forth the general theory of relativity. After World War I, he travelled and lectured in Europe, America, and Asia, while continuing his work in the Berlin Academy. He did not return to Germany after 1933. In that year, he accepted an appointment to the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton. There he died in 1955. Fifteen years before, he had written to President Roosevelt on August 2, 1939.

Some recent work by E. Fermi and L. Szilard which has been communicated to me in manuscript leads me to expect that the element Uranium may be turned into a new and important source of energy in the immediate future. . . . A single bomb of this type . . . exploded in a port . . . might very well destroy the whole port, together with the surrounding territory. . . .<sup>3</sup>

Thus, the compact formula,  $E = mc^2$ , of his 1905 paper found terrifying expression in the miracles and disasters of the atomic era. When later questioned about his role, he responded reluctantly, saying each word separately, "Yes, I pressed the button."<sup>4</sup>

On one of his visits to the United States, Einstein saw his features carved in bas-relief at the Riverside Church in New York, the only living man among hundreds of saints, scientists, kings, and philosophers who have most significantly contributed to making the modern world what it is today. On this solemn occasion, his sense of humor proved victor over other sentiments, for he turned to the pastor, saying, "I might have imagined that they could make a Jewish saint out of me, but I never thought I'd become a Protestant one!"

On November 7, 1944, Einstein wrote to Max Born, "In our scientific expectation we

have grown antipodes. You believe in God playing dice and I in perfect laws in the world of things existing as real objects, which I try to grasp in a wildly speculative way."<sup>5</sup> The scientist's proclamation that "God does not play dice with the world" can guide us to an understanding of several important features of his life and thought.

### I. *His Simplicity and Humility*

The simplicity and brevity of the remark about God is a sign of the general lack of affectation and the deep humility in his speech, conduct, and thought.

In this simple, lucid phrase he is able to sum up his difference in perspective from his colleagues in a complex field of scientific interpretations. On another occasion, when asked how it was that he did not immediately perceive that his early formula,  $E = mc^2$ , meant that every ounce of matter contained such vast energy, he responded with characteristic clarity, "If a fabulously rich man never spends any money, no one can estimate the size of his fortune."<sup>6</sup> Although Einstein's name has commonly been a symbol of the extremely intricate and the incomprehensible, his writings generally are easily read and his thoughts are quickly distilled from them. One of his biographers, Antonina Vallentin, rightly said that he had a "horror of unnecessary words." This infrequently noted trait of the scientist may be confirmed by observing, through the veil of translation, the lucidity and directness of his style and thought in both *The World As I See It* and *Out of My Later Years*, collections of his essays in science, religion, and public affairs. Einstein is readable in ways in which Spinoza, Kant, Hegel, and Wittgenstein are not. He displayed a remarkable facility to express in commonly understood words and analogies even the most complex topics of theoretical physics. Although his style does not have the thunder and lightning of a poetic Nietzsche, it possesses its brevity and lucidity, marks not generally found among German philoso-



phers and scientists, who frequently write in ponderous, complex sentences.

The simple and clear words with which Einstein spoke and wrote are symptomatic of the simplicity and commonness of his personality. He had a delightful sense of humor, loved to converse with children, was devoted to his family, and was moved by a deep concern for the welfare of others. His generosity and self-effacing temperament were such as often to be costly to his own welfare. To human liberty and enlightenment he was religiously dedicated. The ordinary strivings of men for fame, pleasure, and wealth were alien to his Spinozistic personality. "Even when I was a fairly precocious young man," he said, "the nothingness of the hopes and strivings which chase most men restlessly through life came to my consciousness with considerable vitality."<sup>7</sup> He seemed always to be embarrassed by the tide of attention and honor which swept over him. On occasions he left the impression that to him it was a hilarious joke, just as if the adulation was really intended for someone else. With unkempt hair, shrouded in a rumpled sweater and unpressed trousers, and with sockless feet reluctantly encased in shoes, he spurned the bourgeois formalities and ceremonies with which "civilized" life surrounded him and sometimes attempted to smother him. "I believe that a simple and unassuming manner of life is best for everyone," he affirmed, "best both for the body and the mind."<sup>8</sup> "Attending funerals is something one does to please the people around us. In itself it is meaningless. It seems to me not unlike the zeal we polish our shoes with every day just so that no one will say we are wearing dirty shoes."<sup>9</sup> With Spinoza he was inclined to respond to a world which, in missionary spirit, wanted to make him assume the veneer of sophistication, "A man is never better for having a fine gown. It is unreasonable to wrap up things of little or no value in a precious cover."

One of the reasons for Einstein's aliena-

tion from this world's modes of aspiration, dress, and behavior was the passion and depth of thought hidden within him. In many ways he was a stranger among us, free from the customs and obligations under which we toil. There was also an asceticism about him which has characterized many men of genius and saintliness. His colleague and friend, Philipp Frank, says that "he always managed to maintain a certain 'free space' around himself which protected him from all disturbances, a space large enough to contain a world erected by an artistic and scientific imagination."<sup>10</sup> Authentic and distinguished existence for man is found in the intellect's contemplation of the rational structure of the universe. What counts among men is how they think and what they think, not how they dress, whether they receive applause, or how materially prosperous they are. This perspective was clearly revealed in his "Autobiographical Notes" in P. A. Schilpp's volume, *Albert Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist*. The forty-seven pages in which the scientist discloses himself contain only several short paragraphs of personal references and reminiscences. The remainder is a presentation of his reflections on and contributions to scientific thought: an autobiography in mathematical equations! "The essential in the being of a man of my type," he said, "lies precisely in *what* he thinks and *how* he thinks, not in what he does or suffers."<sup>11</sup> As he once observed, he was not cut out for "tandem or teamwork."

Not only were his personal bearing and his style simple, but in a real sense his thought was also, even his distinctly scientific reflections. Perhaps it was profound precisely because of its simplicity. His mind penetrated to the heart of an issue and, shrugging off the confusing maze of superficial and confusing details, laid bare the essence of the matter. This may be said even of his most notable achievement, the theory of relativity. Defining precisely the few postulates necessary for interpreting motion, in an elegant and short

series of deductions he reconstructed, in the special theory of 1905, our scientific understanding of the universe, shattering the Newtonian world view with its doctrines of the absoluteness and independence of space and time. Mathematics, the tool of scientific inquiry, is *par excellence* the language of precision, simplicity, and elegance. In brief and lucid form, through Einstein's idiom it tells us of the simplicity of nature. How much more simply can the deep mysteries of mass-energy relations be expressed than in the phrase,  $E = mc^2$ ? Even when we are pressed into domains of Einstein's science where our mastery of the mathematical language fails us, the impression of the simplicity of both the scientific descriptions and of the reality described nevertheless pours in upon us, as when in the general theory of relativity deductions commence with the compact little formula,  $ds^2 = g_{ik}dx_i dx_k$ . In Einstein as in Spinoza, the complexities of the vast and majestic universe about us are reducible to very simple categories, when one looks to the heart of nature and possesses the proper language for describing what he sees. "The most incomprehensible thing about the world," he observed, "is that it is comprehensible."<sup>12</sup>

While the vigorous and creative energies of his mind frequently carried him to the point of divorce from the common walks of life, he exhibited a compassion for the sufferings of his fellow men, an interest in children and students, a sense of humor, a love of music, and a humility such as has marked those we have judged as the most saintly among men. Shortly after 1905 the world recognized that a new Copernicus had been born. At his death in 1955, it honored, not only a man around whose mind the universe had turned, but also one of great integrity, compassion, and humility.

## II. His Views of God and Religion

The word "God" will be found in Einstein's vocabulary, as the subject of "God

does not play dice" indicates. Its sense is not, however, obvious.

Physical reality in its mathematical simplicity was for Einstein an object, not merely of the understanding, but also of the affections. He says,

Out yonder there was this huge world, which exists independently of us human beings and which stands before us like a great, eternal riddle, at least partially accessible to our inspection and thinking. The contemplation of this world beckoned like a liberation, and I soon noticed that many a man whom I had learned to esteem and to admire had found inner freedom and security in devoted occupation with it. The mental grasp of this extra-personal world within the frame of the given possibilities swam as highest aim half consciously and half unconsciously before my mind's eye. Similarly motivated men of the present and of the past, as well as the insights which they had achieved, were the friends which could not be lost. The road to this paradise was not as comfortable and alluring as the road to religious paradise; but it has proved itself as trustworthy, and I have never regretted having chosen it.<sup>13</sup>

The search for a meaningful life is a religious response, according to the scientist.<sup>14</sup> He conceived religion as basically a practical activity. Its function is "to make clear . . . fundamental ends and valuations and to set them fast in the emotional life of the individual. . . ."<sup>15</sup> Moreover, the goal of religion is service of others: "Man is here for the sake of other men—above all for those upon whose smile and well-being our own happiness depends, and also for the countless unknown souls with whose fate we are connected by a bond of sympathy."<sup>16</sup> Einstein's judgment on the function of religion was very similar to Spinoza's (cf. *Theologico-Political Treatise*). For both of them, the end of religion was the inculcation of obedience.<sup>17</sup>

A distinctly humane type of life among men is the object sought by religion, when it is authentic.

If one purges the Judaism of the Prophets and Christianity as Jesus Christ taught it, of all subsequent additions, especially those of the priests

one is left with a teaching which is capable of curing all the social ills of humanity. It is the duty of every man of good will to strive steadfastly in his own little world to make this teaching of pure humanity a living force, so far as he can.<sup>18</sup>

Einstein therefore counted Buddha and Spinoza as well as Jesus among the select group of creative and authentic religious personalities. It is the moral example of such persons which constitutes one of the most vigorous and elevating impulses to selfless religious living.

In general, Einstein was an opponent of institutionalized religion with its creeds and ceremonies—in short, with its stifling atmosphere of conformity and coercion, which he hated so intensely. While holding to a religious position which may be termed ethical idealism, he nevertheless recognized that the high moral values which enrich our lives are communicated to us in the Judeo-Christian tradition. Consequently, he frequently assumed a favorable attitude toward the historical religious heritage of the West, as when he invested his prestige and energies in Zionist activities. The substance of our traditional religious values is, according to him,

free and self-responsible development of the individual so that he will freely and joyfully put his energies at the service of the community of man. If attention is paid to the content and not to the form, the same words may be considered as the expression of the fundamental democratic principle.<sup>19</sup>

How did Einstein think of God? On one occasion, Rabbi Herbert S. Goldstein cabled him, "Do you believe in God?" With characteristic brevity and frankness, Einstein responded, "I believe in Spinoza's God, who reveals himself in a harmony among all people, not in a God who worries about the destiny and actions of men."<sup>20</sup> It is not unfair, then, to say that the term "God" designated, for the physicist, the mathematical-like, impersonal structure of physical reality. Perhaps one modification is

needed, although we cannot be absolutely certain. The mathematical structure of physical reality may not itself be Einstein's God—God is the spirit or mind which conceives or thinks that structure. For, on occasions he expressed himself thus: "My religion consists of a humble admiration of the illimitable superior spirit who reveals himself in the slightest details we are able to perceive with our frail and feeble minds. That deeply emotional conviction of the presence of a superior reasoning power, which is revealed in the incomprehensible universe forms my idea of God."<sup>21</sup> The personal pronouns "who" and "himself" were evidently inadvertent inexactitudes, for the evidences overwhelmingly testify that his God was as impersonal as Spinoza's. In other passages, he unequivocally rejected the ideas that God can assume attitudes, will reward or punish the objects of creation, and that the individual survives the death of his body.<sup>22</sup> Intelligence is manifest in the universe, but not providential care. We may add a phrase, then, to the incisive Einsteinian aphorism inscribed in Fine Hall, Princeton, and say, "God is subtle, but it is *neither benevolent nor malicious*." A short paragraph, "On Scientific Truth," from Einstein's *World As I See It* will further illumine his convictions about God and truth. Notice again the mention of Spinoza in the passage.

(1) It is difficult even to attach a precise meaning to the term "scientific truth." So different is the meaning of the word "truth" according to whether we are dealing with a fact of experience, a mathematical proposition, or a scientific theory. "Religious truth" conveys nothing clear to me at all.

(2) Scientific research can reduce superstition by encouraging people to think and survey things in terms of cause and effect. Certain it is that a conviction, akin to religious feeling, of the rationality or intelligibility of the world lies behind all scientific work of a higher order.

(3) This firm belief, a belief bound up with deep feeling, in a superior mind that reveals itself in the world of experience, represents my conception of God. In common parlance this may be described as "pantheistic." (Spinoza)

(4) Denominational traditions I can only consider historically and psychologically; they have no other significance for me.<sup>23</sup>

There are a number of references in Einstein's writings to a "cosmic religious experience." In *The World As I See It*, he described rather inadequately three stages in the genealogy of religion. First, among primitive men, fear evoked religious ideas and practices. Second, we discover in history the emergence of a social and moral conception of God, who exercises providential care over his creatures. This God is conceived anthropomorphically. Third, in the case of the cosmic religious experience, there is no anthropomorphically conceived God who is the object of the feeling.

The individual feels the nothingness of human desires and aims and the sublimity and marvellous order which reveal themselves both in Nature and in the world of thought. He looks upon individual existence as a sort of prison and wants to experience the universe as a single significant whole.

The religious geniuses of all ages have been distinguished by this kind of religious feeling, which knows no dogma and no God conceived in man's image; so that there can be no church whose central teachings are based on it. Hence it is precisely among the heretics of every age that we find men who were filled with the highest kind of religious feeling and were in many cases regarded by their contemporaries as atheists, sometimes also as saints.<sup>24</sup>

Einstein called this experience mystical. In his judgment, it is the source of true art and science as well as the fountain of authentic religious living. It is Spinoza's intellectual love of God. But, for both Einstein and Spinoza, the affections as well as the intellect are wrapped up in it. The cosmic religious feeling is truly a state of awe, and in it man finds true humanity. Not to experience it is to be as good as dead. And "in this sense, and in this sense only," says Einstein, "I belong to the ranks of devoutly religious men."<sup>25</sup>

Einstein's cosmic religious feeling is not only the *via mystica*; it is also the *via sci-*

*entiae*. "Science, at its greatest, is identical with religion, at its most sublime,"<sup>26</sup> he asserted. The most important function of art and science is to awaken this feeling in men and to nourish it.<sup>27</sup> Moreover, by the energies of this feeling, men are moved to creative scientific thought.

The cosmic religious experience is the strongest and the noblest, deriving from behind scientific research. No one who does not appreciate the terrific exertions, the devotion, without which pioneer creation in scientific thought cannot come into being can judge the strength of the feeling out of which alone such work, turned away as it is from immediate practical life, can grow.

What deep faith in the rationality of the structure of the world, what a longing to understand even a small glimpse of the reason revealed in the world, there must have been in Kepler and Newton!<sup>28</sup>

Science, religion, and art are three expressions of the love of God. That love of divinity consists in an understanding of and affection for the elegant simplicity of thought deposited in physical reality. In an address in Berlin on the occasion of Max Planck's 60th birthday, Einstein asserted that "the state of mind which enables a man to do work of this kind [involving extraordinary will power and discipline directed to the most general scientific problems] is akin to that of the religious worshipper or the lover; the daily effort comes from no deliberate intention or programme, but straight from the heart."<sup>29</sup> The roots of science are found in this feeling. Science, in turn, purifies the religious impulse of primitive and outrageous anthropomorphisms. In addition to this negative function, science positively contributes to "a religious spiritualization of our understanding of life."<sup>30</sup> "Science without religion is lame, religion without science is blind,"<sup>31</sup> he said, perhaps dredging up from memory at this point the Kantian dictum, "Concepts without percepts are empty, percepts without concepts are blind." Both science and religion will perish in the absence of the cosmic religious feeling.

Einstein's pacifism, with its testimonies



his fellow feeling and his social concern, must be left aside. A few observations should be made, however, about his connections with the Zionist movement. Although he loosed himself from institutionalized religion and maintained a critical attitude toward the traditional conception of God, he found himself moved by the conspiracy of circumstances, especially in Germany, to identify himself with the Jewish community. In the 1930's he said, "It was when I came to Germany, fifteen years ago, that I discovered that I was a Jew and I owe this discovery more to non-Jews than to Jews."<sup>32</sup> The everlasting longing for independence, the cultivation of creative intellectual enterprises, and the love of justice among the Jews "prove to me that it is my destiny to belong to them."<sup>33</sup> Einstein became friends with Chaim Weizmann after World War I. He then helped those supporting the Zionist movement, though he never officially joined the movement itself and was never a political Zionist. His motives were chiefly of a humanitarian nature. Above all, the Hebrew University in Jerusalem interested him. Consequently, his first trip to the United States in 1921 was for the purpose of raising funds for the University and the Zionist movement.

The nature of Einstein's religious orientation dictated that his Zionist sympathies would be of a general cultural and humanitarian character. To him Judaism was not a creed. It was a way of serving men and sanctifying life. Nor was Judaism a political entity, in his opinion. He would only go so far as to concede that a Palestinian center for Judaism would give unity and direction to the ongoing cultural life of Jews everywhere. In Zionism, we discover a technique for creating a feeling of self-respect among Jews and also for providing a refuge, though an inadequate one, for homeless peoples. He recognized that, while his position occasionally gave strength and prestige to Jewish nationalism and religious orthodoxy,

the humanitarian and cultural benefits outweighed these unsatisfactory results.<sup>34</sup> "I believe," he said, "that the existence of a Jewish cultural center will strengthen the moral and political position of the Jews all over the world, by virtue of the very fact that there will be in existence a kind of embodiment of the interests of the whole Jewish people."<sup>35</sup> Einstein felt deeply the obligation of the Jews to place at the disposal of mankind their intellectual and moral heritage in order that the struggle for peace and humane behavior might prove victorious.

Those who are raging today against the ideals of reason and individual liberty and are trying to establish a spiritless state-slavery by brute force rightly see in us their irreconcilable foes. History has given us a difficult row to hoe; but so long as we remain devoted servants of truth, justice, and liberty, we shall continue not merely to survive as the oldest of living peoples, but by creative work to bring forth fruits which contribute to the ennoblement of the human race, as heretofore.<sup>36</sup>

### III. Conclusion

Philipp Frank observes that one of Einstein's most characteristic traits was

his intractable hatred of any form of coercion arbitrarily imposed by one group of people on another. He detested the idea of the oppressor preventing the oppressed from following their inclinations and developing their natural talents, and turning them into automatons. On the other hand Albert was also conscious of the natural laws of the universe; he felt that there are great eternal laws of nature. . . . This dual attitude—hatred for the arbitrary laws of man and devotion to the laws of nature— . . . accompanied Einstein throughout his life and explains many of his actions that have been considered peculiar and inconsistent.<sup>37</sup>

The laws, customs, and expectations of men are part of the face of nature. Reality or God lies hidden beneath. In this Spinozistic deity, we find the natural habitation of creative reason and the object of the cosmic religious feeling. Nothing in this world—the principalities and powers of politics, economics, race, or organized religion—can coerce men whose spirits, liberated from the

bonds of this world, are caught up in the intellectual love of God.

Some of the symbols of liberation and union with the divine in Einstein were non-conformist dress, world-shattering thoughts, compassion for his fellow men, a sense of the ridiculousness of conventional behavior, and a deep humility. The signs that he could not completely escape flesh and blood, and indeed felt obliged to participate in the contests of this world, were his support of pacifism, his dedication to Zionist ideals, his participation in the League of Nations, his contest against those "cool blond people [who] . . . have no psychological comprehension of others," and his courage and realism in deciding, contrary to his personal feelings, to press the button which signaled the opening of the atomic era.

In his use of mathematics as the key to an understanding of nature, his view of physical reality, his faith in the competence of reason, his interpretation of the divine, his attitude toward organized religion and its function, and his personality and conduct, Einstein was a twentieth-century Spinoza. Just as in Spinoza's case, subsequent generations will turn in the verdict that he was, despite his failure to live up to orthodox expectations, a genuinely religious person. Observe how well Friedrich Schleiermacher's tribute to Spinoza applies to him.

The high World-Spirit pervaded him; the Infinite was his beginning and his end; the Universe was his only and his everlasting love. In holy innocence and in deep humility he beheld himself mirrored in the eternal world, and perceived how he also was its most worthy mirror. He was full of religion, full of the Holy Spirit. Wherefore, he stands there alone and unequalled; master in his art, yet without disciples and without citizenship, sublime above the profane tribe.<sup>28</sup>

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# Cognitive Possibilities of Religious Intuition

HOWARD R. BURKLE\*

CONSIDERED philosophically, religious knowledge enjoys no privileges. Like any other form of knowledge it must choose among a limited number of possible epistemologies and give a plausible account of its procedures, special interests and limitations.

Religious knowledge may be empirical: in which case it draws upon the flow of sensations which arise out of interaction with the environment. It may be rationalistic: which means that it calls upon the mind to generate concepts out of the material innate to its own substance. It may be authoritarian: in which case it appeals to some external source—a sacred book, institution or person—for the information which it believes has been deposited there for its edification. Or it may be intuitional: which implies that it derives its notions from the organic and emotional intimations which well up continuously from the depths of the self.

These knowledge orientations are basic because they arise from an emphasis on various facets of the very structure of human nature: empiricism from an emphasis on the sense organs, rationalism on the intellect, authoritarianism on the will as executive agent, and intuition on the emotions and subconsciousness.

Each of these general approaches has proved its abiding usefulness to theology. They have all served as the basis of important theological systems, and at this late date

no one of them is likely to triumph over the others as the sole religious approach. Nonetheless, it would appear that intuition has a certain appropriateness to religion which the others lack. There is a special bond between religion and intuition because the core activities of spiritual aspiration—prayer, worship and meditation—are, like intuition, movements of the interior life, occurring at depths which escape the full scrutiny of consciousness. If these spiritual experiences are to have cognitive significance, it would appear that they should be interpreted as special forms of intuition. Consequently, I believe that there is a need to reflect upon the meaning of intuition and to consider what it has to offer as a vehicle for explicating the cognitive potentialities of religious experience.

## I. Intuition Seems Unpromising

That intuition should be considered a useful instrument for religion is not surprising, but that it should be regarded as a promising means of enhancing the stature of religion as a cognitive discipline is bound to seem strange. At present intuition stands in philosophical disrepute. Whether it is used to designate the mysterious promptings which guide feminine betters to pick equine winners at the track, or the flash of predatory sagacity by which juvenile chess prodigies see how to checkmate international champions in ten moves, or the powers of extra-sensory perception exercised by certain extraordinary individuals, or the rapturous vision of the Absolute described by mystics, intuition connotes the occult, the irrational and the arbitrary.

Therefore, a fresh appeal to intuition may seem like a desperate attempt to defend the rationality of religion on the only ground

\*HOWARD R. BURKLE is Associate Professor of Philosophy and Religion in Grinnell College. He is author of the article "Toward a Christian Pragmatism," recently published in *The Christian Scholar* (Dec., 1958, Vol. XLI, No. 4). The present paper was read at the annual meeting of the Rocky Mountain Section of NABI held at the Cotner School of Religion, Lincoln, Nebraska, October 30-31, 1959.

which scientific inquiry has not yet thoroughly undermined: the inner man. It will strike others as a violation of Bertrand Russell's warning against letting our mystical impulses overpower our logical or scientific powers. And to still others, recourse to intuition will be interpreted as Brunner views mysticism—a sinful stratagem by which man tries to capture and manipulate God.

Such suspicions arise because intuition has become the refuge of those who do not believe that knowledge of God is possible. We tend to accept the phenomenalist's definition of the religious situation: we assume that the manifold of sensations which comprises our conscious life places an imperious film before the mind. Even if like William James we sense that in the subconsciousness we are "conterminous and continuous," with "a More" of the same quality as our own higher selves,<sup>1</sup> we do not claim to know what the More is. Like Bertocci, who amplifies James' point, we do not consider religious experience a source of knowledge, but "of moral power and inspiration."<sup>2</sup> We see ourselves with only the subjective effects of what is assumed to be God's impact upon us from the dimension beyond all possible human experience. Like Karl Heim's prisoners who tap out messages on the walls of their cells trying to communicate with other prisoners who are assumed to be nearby,<sup>3</sup> we watch the strange movements of our environment and listen to the music of our feelings, wistfully wondering whether they constitute evidence of their creator.

## II. *The Intuitionist Claims to Disclose the Super-Rational*

One reason for the obscurantist reputation of intuition is that it has lost its once important role in rational inquiry. Once, as in Plato's "figure of the divided line,"<sup>4</sup> intuition was thought of as the highest stage of knowledge. It was the act of seeing all

proximate truths in their dependence upon the Idea of the Good and in their relation to each other. Intuition brought all preliminary stages of reasoning to full intelligibility.

This no longer holds, however, in the theory of knowledge which has obtained since Descartes; this view, which Mascall calls the "modern ideal" as opposed to the "traditional" one, prizes analytical clarity and logical consistency above all else. It is more interested in avoiding error rather than in seeing deeply. It prefers to manipulate rather than to contemplate.<sup>5</sup> In order to compete under these altered standards of intelligibility, intuition has turned away from consciousness and become more and more identified with emotional and organic experience.

The intuitionist does not consider this a move toward irrationalism; in fact, he sees it as the development of a deeper kind of knowledge, a new version of the old claim to ultimate intelligibility. Now a new note of defensiveness is heard; intuition is not so much the culmination and support of analytical intelligence as it is its rival.

Bergson, for example, deliberately formulates his doctrine of intuition as a counterpoise to scientific rationality. Whereas science is symbolic and abstract, intuition is direct and concrete. So the comparison continues, always in favor of intuition. Whereas science views objects externally, intuition grasps them directly from inside. Science is static, analytical, practical and merely relative, but intuition is dynamic, whole, disinterested and absolute.<sup>6</sup>

Bergson is attempting to establish a distinctive metaphysical methodology, a way of seeing reality which is not a mere aping of science, and he thinks that distinctiveness requires contrariety. Metaphysics must be everything that science is not, and in rationality it must be superior. If the intellect gives a rational view of things, then intuition must give a supra-rational view. Intuition lies deeper than mere rationality as the rich



source from which intellect and the other natural cognitive modality, instinct, have evolved by diminution and specialization.

Through intuition, which Bergson calls "intellectual sympathy," we enter the rhythm of the inner life of other creatures, emphatically participate in their experience and identify with their aspirations. In one spiritual thrust man backtracks on the course of the evolution of consciousness. This reunion of intelligence and instinct, this fusion of the rational and the infra-rational in a supra-rational unity, is intuition.<sup>7</sup> Theologically, it is a return of the soul to God through a momentary interpenetration of their life centers. Human nature is lifted beyond the natural plane and the intellect is inspired and expanded by a burning creative force. What a human being, thus aroused, is able to know cannot be contained in mere concepts, but can be suggested through words which are "supple, mobile and almost fluid."<sup>8</sup>

It seems to me that insofar as Bergson tries to conceive a mode of consciousness which gathers all normal faculties into a cooperating unity his doctrine of intuition is sound, but that in attempting to achieve such unification on what is essentially an emotionalistic basis it falls prey to the several charges of irrationalism which have been directed against it.<sup>9</sup> It is his biologicistic view of human nature and his immanentistic view of God which make this inevitable. The moment the intellect is invited to let itself be reabsorbed into the receptacle of evolution, all possibility of making a cogent case for intuition as a super-intelligibility is lost.

The most promising course leads in the opposite direction: not back to the primitive life force from which all things receive their substance, but forward in the way human faculties are already developing. More, not less, of intelligence is required; and more also of the other aspects of awareness: heightened emotional sensitivity, sharpened sensory perceptions. Later I shall indicate a

few of the traits which such a form of intuition would possess.

### III. *Neo-Thomist Intuition Avoids Obscurantism*

In the Thomistic version intuition is made to operate in connection with the senses and the intellect, thus avoiding the need to draw upon organic sources. Jacques Maritain uses the term intuition to refer to the act of cognizing being at its most fundamental level, "esse" or the act of existence. Intuition completes sensation and conception. First the senses present the object to perception. Then the intellect abstracts the essence and grasps the object as a classifiable, knowable unity. Then intuition pierces through the sensory facade, passes behind the generality of the concept, and steps directly into existence itself, into what Maritain calls the "supra-observable field" of being as such.<sup>10</sup>

The encounter with existence is not achieved by rational analysis, nor by inductive or deductive procedure, nor again by syllogistic construction, Maritain says. Intuition is an unpredictable and individual vision which cuts directly to the root of being and releases the act of existing "into intelligible light." In whatever way it occurs, whether by the act of an imperial intellect relying on its own strength, by an acute natural sensitivity to living, or through the sort of inner anguish so valued by existentialists, it requires of one "to take the leap, to release in one authentic intellectual intuition, the sense of being, the sense of the value of the implications that lie in the act of existing."<sup>11</sup>

In this eidetic visualization, as Maritain calls it, knowledge reaches the core of each being, where its true nature, or *suppositum*, resides. Intuition deals with that in which a thing is unique, with those features which defy generalization; therefore it cannot offer a conceptual understanding of existence. Still, Maritain would insist, intuition is knowledge, knowledge of being at its deep-

est, densest and most luminous level. It is open to everyone although not everyone achieves it. It comes by "luck, a boon, perhaps a kind of docility to light." There is no mechanical mastery of it. The metaphysician is a kind of seer who is "enraptured with being."<sup>12</sup>

The Neo-Thomist doctrine of intuition claims to avoid irrationalism, but, I think, it does not really succeed. By discussing intuition in connection with perception and inductive abstraction Maritain conveys the impression that intuition shares in their definiteness. According to this claim intuition takes sense and thought as its point of departure and goes beyond them by a kind of internal vision which illuminates the deeper and unexpressed recesses of being. Intuition, thus, adds to the clarity of normal cognition.

This claim is misleading, however, because the step which intuition takes beyond conception leads into a dimension which is admittedly impervious to the human intellect. Existence is by definition that whose essence is to have no essence. As Maritain puts it, there is a "dimension of opacity or of radical unintelligibility—a deposit of intelligibility not intelligible by itself—which lies deeper in proportion to the distance which separates things from the pure act of existing."<sup>13</sup> As long as intuition has this realm of radical unintelligibility as its proper object, its claim to know existence must remain dubious.

Even if it is true that existence is superlatively intelligible to God, this does not remove the suspicions of irrationality from intuition as a human mode of knowing. It assures us that existence is intelligible to someone and reassures us that there is more to each being than what is disclosed to the senses and intellect, but does not yield actual information of these deeper regions. Indeed, there are moments when it appears that what Maritain means by intuition is the power we have to respond to existence with

the deepest emotion and the liveliest appreciation of worth. Which is to say, Maritain merely follows a different route to Bergson's destination.

#### IV. *Intuition as the Common Sensitivity*

Perhaps the reason that the previous theories lapse into irrationalism is that they treat intuition as one source of truth alongside others. Since the other sources define the ordinary meaning of intelligibility, intuition is forced either to cultivate an alliance with emotion (as in Bergson) or to claim that it is a special and superior kind of sight by which man steps beyond the limits of the senses and intellect (as in Maritain). Since both of these alternatives finally arrive at a kind of private rapture which is incommunicable and inexplicable, they do not make good their claim to offer greater intelligibility.

We may ask what follows if one strikes out on an entirely different route. Suppose that intuition is not just one more source of truth distinguished from the others as their alternative and competitor. Suppose instead that it is the common sensitivity which underlies and pervades the individual senses. In this case the several channels of consciousness are particular and partial forms by which the single power of awareness reaches out to its world. Intuition would be present in sensation, intellection and emotion, and would play a crucial role in their operations as: (1) the power to be immediately receptive to what is given, and (2) the power to receive the standards by which the given is rendered intelligible.

(1) It is not owing to equivocation that all of the conventional sources of truth use the word intuition and appeal to a moment of immediate encounter as their point of departure. It is a sign of their common rootage in intuition. The empiricist uses intuition to designate that aspect of perception in which the perceiver has direct contact with the object. It is the act of receiving and holding

that primordial layer of sense content in which a trans-mental reality first rises to awareness.

The rationalist (for example, Descartes) has an analogous meaning for intuition. It is the mental act in which a mind "unclouded and attentive" sees certain basic truths such as "a triangle is bounded by three sides" or "I exist and think." Here it is the act of grasping the self-evidence of such basic principles and thus establishing the premises from which reasoning proceeds. Enough has been said of the emotionalistic kind of intuition to indicate that it too recognizes the moment of direct encounter and reception.

Considered as the common sensitivity, intuition underlies the generation of percepts, concepts and feelings. Intuition is neither a blend of three separate cognitive faculties nor an entirely separate faculty. It is the internally diversified way in which the single human percipient receives and focuses its world.

Intuition feeds and sustains the senses, emotions and intellect. Empirically intuition supports the analysis of the interrelations among percepts, rationally it sustains the analysis of the connections among concepts, emotionally it supports the enjoyment of the feelings. Intuition is the basic receptivity present in every form of human awareness which links man to all levels of being around him; it is the several-sided but single way in which the percipient organism grasps its surrounding.

(2) But intuition is more. It is the power, expressed through all the faculties, to reach beyond the circumscribed area in which they usually function and to become sensitive to more than natural meanings. Intuition opens the normal faculties to the sources from which phenomena arise, to the standard by which logical relations have their validity, to the values by which the deepest emotions are moved. Indeed, intuition in this second aspect shows that we have all along been open to this further source, and that knowledge is

possible only because this is the case. Let me explain this further.

#### IV. *Intuition and Revelation*

Intuition is sensitivity to essential meaning and value; by adding this dimension intuition facilitates, extends and completes knowledge. Intuition adds understanding to technical clarity; it bridges the chasm between theology and science; it brings together value and fact. However it may be expressed, intuition is that through which the supernatural bears in upon nature and renders it intelligible.

The positivist denies this facet of knowledge on grounds that it is unverifiable. In a sense this is correct. It cannot be judged by any other standard because it is that by which all other standards are measured.

Intuition works through the specific senses and builds upon them; it does not abandon its base for a leap into the ineffable, nor does it throw an entirely different kind of intellectual power into operation. And yet neither does intuition see goodness as the eye sees yellow, nor comprehend beauty as the intellect conceives the principle of identity. Goodness and beauty cannot be reduced to visual images or concepts. But we do sometimes see goodness in and through sense images, in and through concepts, in and through emotion. These media, themselves finite, can be transparent to value. They do not merely imitate or mediate by representing something else. They convey. They reveal. On what terms and under what conditions the things of nature reveal—whether or not sufficiently for salvation, whether to all men or only to some—is a further question, for another occasion.

I do not mean that things reveal in Berkeley's sense. The whole "furniture of heaven and earth" are not ideas directly stimulated in our sensorium by the Absolute Spirit. Nor do I mean this in Emerson's sense. Nature is not a projection of God's subjectivity which we are privileged to contemplate

through Him. I do mean this in Aquinas' sense: things have their status as second causes; they are really other than the creator, and yet so intimate is their dependence that they reflect some minute aspect of Him analogously. I visualize the creature's reflecting power in agreement with Jonathan Edwards, who thought that nature can speak profusely of its redeemer in its every joint and limb. The *imago dei* is not an exclusively human possession. Tillich's definition of symbol is helpful at this point: creatures express their creator by participating in Him. All of which suggests that God is present to the creation not only to be adored and obeyed as its distant creator, but to be encountered and known as its sustainer.

The main point is that intuition conducts the divine being directly to consciousness. Intuition effects a shift in attention away from things as they are in their own right to things as expressions of their source. Intuition sets up a fresh perspective and causes new features to come into prominence; it brings things into juxtaposition with their eternal norm and sheds light on the whole range of knowledge.

As in Karl Heim's scheme, breaking through to the divine dimension releases a flood of light which clarifies and enriches the matters understood factually by relating them to their ultimate purpose.<sup>14</sup> But unlike Heim's view, the theory being outlined here refuses to represent the deity as a dimension of space, unless somehow this can be conceived as the incarnation of the God who is essentially beyond spatial and temporal restrictions. But in this case, the divine dimension would not be the highest, fifth dimension of the universe, a *logos* which is neither divine nor human, but the mystery of the embodiment of the eternal God in these dimensions where men actually exist.

Nor is it necessary that the holy be an aspect of the world as in Harold K. Schilling's scheme, where the holy is said to be one of at least three different "aspects or compo-

nents" of the environment.<sup>15</sup> There is not a worshipper's dimension alongside the poet's and the scientist's dimensions; intuition has no need of a divine component of nature to encounter.

Intuition, then, does not simply add the supernatural element to the total fund of information, nor does it enhance the knowledge we have of one part of nature by adding further knowledge which we have gained of other and higher dimensions of nature. Intuition is the human process by which the truth from beyond nature is received and radiated within nature.

Augustine is right, I think, when he says that the truth can be recognized only in the light of the divine truth, and Plato is right when he argues that both the object of knowledge and the knowing organ must be illuminated by the source of all intelligibility. Intuition presupposes God, and since intuition is the root sensitivity pervading all specific forms of knowledge, all knowing presupposes God.

Socrates was justified in his disappointment with the Anaxagorean physics. He saw correctly that to give the reason of things requires more than to describe the parts of nature, their relations and interactions. He insisted justifiably that each thing must also be seen in relation to the Good. Socrates' being in prison awaiting execution is not explained by a description of the room, the chair, Socrates' body and its posture in the chair, nor even by an analysis of his psychological state, but by Socrates' judgment that it is better to obey the command of the Athenian jury than to flee.

It is true that this approach can easily be used to distort actuality to fit *a priori* preferences. Santayana is right in contending that this principle has sometimes obstructed advance in the sciences,<sup>16</sup> but he does not make good his assertion that the principle itself is puerile. If to understand something is, among other things, to see it in relation to its purpose as defined by the highest level



of being, then such understanding is neither shallow nor arbitrary. It is quite as difficult to view something under the aspect of value as it is to describe its observable features and analyze its operations. For example, when Socrates undertakes to define the State according to its ideal meaning, as it ought to be, he sets out on a task which is as arduous and constrained by truth as any form of inquiry can be.

Intuition as I am using it resembles what E. L. Mascall calls *intellectus*, which is the power of the mind to see through its experience. It is contemplative and passivistic, as compared with the manipulative and activist mentality which Mascall calls *ratio*. The latter, whose dominance he is anxious to combat, regards concepts as mere inferences from sense data rather than intelligibles. Against this Mascall asserts the power of the mind to see through its perceptions and conceptions into the realm of trans-sensible being.<sup>17</sup>

Mascall's view is preferable to that of other Neo-Thomists in that it avoids the obscurantist element which we saw in Maritain. Mascall seems to be speaking of the power of the mind to take in more than it ordinarily knows, to reach beyond its own usual limits, to recognize signals which it usually misses. It is this note of normal but heightened rationality which I am trying to catch as the very heart of intuition. It is usually lost when intuition is made an esoteric mode of vision of gazing at hidden dimensions of being, rather than the intensified grasping of this world through the normal avenues of awareness, in the light of the divine illumination. Intuition is not seeing what is hidden but what is there before our eyes.

If, as I think, Mascall is correct in having such confidence in man's ability to understand, it is strange that he restricts the direction of cognitive penetration to sensory data. Why not open up all the channels of knowledge? The arguments he uses to estab-

lish empirically grounded *intellectus* work equally well for rationalistic and emotive *intellectus*. Let me develop this claim by reference to Augustine, another defender of a single-channel doctrine, although in this case rationalism rather than empiricism.

#### V. The Intuition Beyond Intuition

In the tenth chapter of the *Confessions* Augustine attempts to remember how he came to know God. First he searches among the images of sense: the innumerable sounds and smells, the marvelous sights and feelings which he has experienced and stored up in memory. But none of them is God, nor do they contain or conceal Him. They cry out with a loud voice, "He made us; seek Him elsewhere."

Convinced that God is not to be found in the outer world, Augustine redirects his gaze upon himself. Notice, he does not at this moment begin to be introspective, for he was already that even when scrutinizing sense images. Those were not fresh sensations derived from a direct examination of nature, but memories of past sensations. Augustine thus has already started the retreat into the private self; the only question is which part of it will be found to contain the clue to God and thus to all understanding.

And I turned myself unto myself, and behold, in me there present themselves to me soul, and body, one without, the other within. By which of these ought I to seek my God? I had sought Him in the body from Earth to Heaven, so far as I could send messengers, the beams of mine eyes. But the better is the inner. . . . These things did my inner man know by the ministry of the outer: I the inner knew them; I, the mind . . . asked the whole frame of the world about my God; and it answered me, 'I am not He, but He made me.'<sup>18</sup>

Thus Augustine establishes a theological rationalism. He turns away from sensation, and for the moment by-passes authority, and he gazes expectantly into the soul itself. Having noted the direction the search is taking, he goes on. He examines the vegetative

and animal levels of the soul in vain. He searches among the operations of the rational soul, again in vain. On through the "fields and spacious palaces" of his memory he roams until finally he enters into the "very seat of the mind." But even this noblest place in the human substance yields the same conclusion: "Neither wert Thou there . . . because Thou art the Lord God of the mind." Every possibility has been exhausted. Does this mean that even the intellect, this tiny exit from the cave of illusion, is theologically no more helpful than the outer world? In one sense, yes; the intellect no less than the humblest natural object is a creature and does not contain God. But in another sense the intellect marks the end of the search; although it does not contain God, it is the base from which we take the fruitful step. "I will pass even beyond this power of mine which is called memory," he says, "yes, I will pass beyond it, that I may approach unto Thee who abidest above me."<sup>20</sup>

Only then does the search bear fruit, only when he has retired into the mind and been carried beyond it. "Where then did I find Thee, that I might learn Thee, but in Thee above me?" Augustine asks. "In Thee above me," is the crucial phrase. Neither in the body nor in the soul did Augustine find God, not even in that noblest of all parts of the soul, the intellect. "Place there is none," he says; "we go backward and forward, and there is no place." It is only above the inner self that God may be found, which is to say, it is only by relating the self to Him who is over against it as its creator. The soul rises up and "with the flash of one trembling glance" arrives "at That Which Is." It attains to the "unchangeable and true Eternity of Truth above" the "changeable mind."<sup>21</sup>

But the soul does not fix its gaze upon eternal truth. It recoils and returns at once to its familiar and habitual world, retaining

"a loving memory" of the truth it has touched and a new understanding of the world as it now appears in the light of that truth. The mind is now aided in "judging soundly on things mutable," and in saying "This ought to be thus, this not."

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<sup>15</sup> Harold K. Schilling, "On Relating Science and Religion," *The Christian Scholar*, Vol. XLI, No. 3, September, 1958, pp. 376-7.

<sup>16</sup> George Santayana, *Three Philosophical Poets* (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1953), pp. 71-73.

<sup>17</sup> Mascall, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 29-34.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 34-42.

<sup>19</sup> Augustine, *Confessions* (New York: Pocket Library, 1957), trans. by Edward B. Pusey, p. 178.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 188-9.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 120-1.

# John Wesley as Biblical Scholar

ROBIN SCROGGS\*

NO one would want to dispute John Wesley's own claim to be a man of One Book. Yet it is surprising how often scholars, both biblical and theological, overlook the significant work Wesley did on the Scriptures, especially the New Testament. Despite the value of his fearless modification of the King James translation, his text is casually dismissed in histories of the English Bible. Despite the distillation of Wesley's theology in the *Explanatory Notes upon the New Testament*,<sup>1</sup> his commentary is not often considered a primary source of his thought. It is our purpose here to investigate both his translation and his commentary, and to attempt to show the quality and value of the biblical scholarship of this multi-talented thinker.

Much of the merit of this work arises from that rare harmony of intellect and piety which was distinctive of Wesley. Although it is true that in Methodist theology the mind was intended to serve the heart, this was for Wesley a necessary service. When Wesley opened the pages of his New Testament, his classical education at Oxford was not forgotten, and it is certainly in character that he turned to the best biblical scholarship of his day for guidance.

The translation and commentary, originally conceived as a single work, was finished by Wesley in amazing time. Toward the latter part of 1753 he was afflicted with an illness which brought him near to death. During convalescence he began writing the *Notes*, although the idea for such a work had been in his mind for some time. His diary of January 4, 1754 records:

On Sunday the 6th I began writing Notes on the

New Testament—a work which I should never have attempted had I not been so ill as not to be able to travel or preach, and yet not so ill as to be able to read and write.<sup>2</sup>

Maintaining a "convalescent" schedule of a sixteen-hour day, Wesley finished a rough draft of the translation by March 19.<sup>3</sup> The commentary was crowded out, however, by a few of Wesley's other activities and was not completed until Fall, 1775.<sup>4</sup> The *Notes* went through five editions during Wesley's lifetime alone, a strong indication that the Methodist societies found the work an essential aid in their understanding of the Christian life. In 1790 the biblical text was printed by itself. Cell maintains this as proof that Wesley considered his translation worthy enough to be read as a distinct and independent text.<sup>5</sup>

## The Translation

Wesley writes in the preface to the *Notes*:

... I design first, to set down the Text itself, for the most Part, in the common *English* Translation, which is in general (so far as I can judge) abundantly the best that I have seen. Yet I do not say, it is incapable of being brought in several Places nearer to the Original. Neither will I affirm, That the *Greek* copies from which this Translation was made, are always the most correct. And therefore I shall take the Liberty, as occasion may require, to make here and there a small Alteration.<sup>6</sup>

These small alterations resulted in about 12,000 changes from the Authorized Version. The soundness of these changes is well indicated in a sampling by George Cell. In the sections examined by Cell, never less than one-half and often as many as three-fourths of Wesley's modifications have been accepted by the Revised Version and other modern translations.<sup>7</sup>

\*MR. SCROGGS is Instructor in Biblical Literature at Dartmouth College.

What are the causes of the alterations? It is Cell's view that a large proportion of Wesley's changes are due to more accurate Greek readings.<sup>8</sup> On the samplings I have made, such a view cannot be sustained. The most productive period of textual work had not yet arrived, and the two greatest New Testament manuscripts, Vaticanus and Sinaiticus, were still unavailable to scholars. The textual variants Wesley did incorporate were due in large measure to the great work of J. A. Bengel, who published a text of the New Testament in 1734<sup>9</sup> and a large commentary upon the Greek text in 1742.<sup>10</sup> From the perspective of history Bengel has been called the greatest textual scholar of his day, and his text marks a new era, according to Kenyon, in textual criticism.<sup>11</sup> As will be noted, Wesley drew heavily upon Bengel's work. Part of the Methodist leader's genius consisted in his accurate judgment of the quality of others' work, for Bengel was by no means as highly regarded in his own day as in ours.

A more important cause for changes was Wesley's desire to modernize the archaic English of the King James text. This modernization is most happily seen in the choice of prepositions. For example, in Acts 12:5 the phrase, "Prayer was made without ceasing of the church unto God for him," becomes, "Continual Prayer was made to God by the church for him." "Down to" something becomes "down on"; "throughout" becomes "through," agreeing with the modern use of the words. The sometimes indirect speech of the King James Version has been straightened. In Mt. 1:6 the Authorized Version reads, "And David the King begat Solomon of her that had been the wife of Urias." Wesley's text reads, "And David the king begat Solomon, of the wife of Uriah." Superfluous words such as "that" and "as" are completely removed.

Other alterations attempt to make the translation closer to the meaning of the Greek. Thus in Mt. 2:8 "to inquire dili-

gently" (*ἀκριβῶς*) becomes "to inquire exactly," a more accurate nuance. "To worship" (*προσκυνῶ*) becomes "to do one homage," a more literal, if not always a more meaningful, translation. "Charity" becomes "love" in I Cor. 13. *Καταλλαγή* is now "reconciliation" rather than "atonement" in Rom. 5:11. But the numerically greatest change concerns the Greek participial phrase, often so troublesome to translators. As is well known, Greek idiom depends heavily on the participle, while good English usage demands a more restrained use. Usually, participial phrases are converted in translation into dependent clauses. This practice is followed fairly rigidly, although not exclusively, by the King James translators. Wesley, however, preferred to keep the participial construction. In almost every place he puts the dependent clause back into a participial phrase. The result is not always happy. In Mt. 2:22, for example, the Authorized Version reads: "But when he heard that Archelaus did reign in Judea in the room of his father Herod." Wesley's translation is more clumsily put: "But having heard, Archelaus reigneth over Judea in the room of his father Herod." This attempt at archaism rarely enhances the translation, but fortunately it does not always detract.

Finally, it is clear that Wesley on occasion differed from the King James version for theological reasons. Cell mentions the frequent changes from "shall" to "will."<sup>12</sup> In I Cor. 1:8 the older text reads, "Who shall also confirm (*βεβαιώσαι*) you unto the end," while Wesley reads, "Who will also confirm you." Here a subtle emphasis is removed from predestination and placed on foreknowledge, certainly a change coming from the heart of Wesley's theology. Another alteration based on theological motives can be seen in Gal. 5:17. The King James Version reads: "For the flesh lusteth against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh and these are contrary the one to the other so that (*ὅνα*) ye cannot do the things that y-



would." The discussion revolves around the last clause, introduced by the conjunction *iva*. Usually *iva* in koine introduces a purpose clause, although theoretically a result clause can follow. Wesley, apparently afraid that the King James language infers results, translated the clause "that ye may not do the things which ye would," ensuring that the clause be interpreted as purpose. Wesley, of course, wanted to make sure that nothing takes away freedom from the will. Modern commentators seem to agree with him at this point. The RSV puts the matter in even less ambiguous language: "For these are opposed to each other, to prevent you from doing what you would."

In summary, it can be said that the translation of John Wesley was a highly successful one for his day, based on the soundest learning at his disposal. While there are a few mistakes and some visible influences of his theology, his revision as a whole can be verified from the text itself. It is hard to believe that Wesley could have accomplished this masterful job in such a short time. The result is a modern English translation, concise, clear, yet somehow maintaining most of the sonority of the older version. This work alone should merit a place for Wesley among the great religious scholars of the eighteenth century. What we have said so far is instructive about the man as well as the work. Although this strong-minded individual undoubtedly believed in the true inspiration of the Bible, he was open to the most advanced biblical criticism and did not hesitate to revise text, translation, or meaning wherever reason appeared to demand it.

### *The Commentary*

The commentary as a whole can be considered a triumph of Wesley's judgment. This is perhaps most clearly seen in the format given to the book. Compared with the works of his contemporaries, Wesley's organization is startlingly lucid and modern. In his preface to the commentary he men-

tions four previous works on which he is dependent. One is Bengel's *Gnomon Novi Testamenti*, a learned work completely inaccessible to the average reader. The second is Philip Doddridge's *Family Expositor*.<sup>13</sup> This apparently was a popular work, but its format is clumsy if we may judge from the 1745 edition. On one side of the page is the King James text. On the other is a paraphrase, attempting to draw out the full meaning of the text. At the bottom of the page are a few technical notes, and at the end of sections are hortatory remarks called "Improvements." The Gospels are arranged in the order of a harmony. John Guyse is the third author used by Wesley, who consulted the former's *Practical Expositor*.<sup>14</sup> The 1797 edition of the work shows a format similar to that of Doddridge with few exceptions. The last work is the *Theological Lectures* by John Heylyn.<sup>15</sup> The format of Heylyn's 1749 edition is simpler than the works previously mentioned but unfortunately also less helpful. The work is largely a paraphrase with a few sparse notes at the bottom of the page.

The format Wesley chose is different in every way. Instead of a paraphrase and the King James text, Wesley offered a different translation of the text itself. Following Bengel's edition of the Greek text, Wesley arranged the text by paragraphs rather than verses. Commenting on this arrangement he says, "And eve. this is such a help in many Places, as one who has not tried it can scarcely conceive."<sup>16</sup> Hardly a disputable judgment! About half the page is text, about half notes. The great advantage is that everything Wesley wants to say, whether critical, exegetical, or hortatory, is contained within the one set of notes. These notes are severely concise, rarely ambiguous, and almost always of real value. Thus the text is not eclipsed by the notes, and there is enough text on every page so that one is not forever flipping pages. Few modern English commentaries have as helpful a

format for the lay person as does Wesley's.

Any commentary stands or falls, however, on the value of its content, and immediately a serious problem is raised. It is best to begin with Wesley's own words, again from the Preface.

I once designed to write down, barely what occurred to my own Mind, consulting none but the inspired Writers. But no sooner was I acquainted with that great Light of the Christian World . . . *Bengelius*, than I entirely changed my Design, being throughly [*sic*] convinced, it might be of more Service to the Cause of Religion, were I barely to translate his *Gnomon Novi Testamenti*, than to write many Volumes upon it. Many of his excellent Notes I have therefore translated. Many more I have abridged; omitting that Part which was purely critical, and giving the Substance of the rest.<sup>17</sup>

He remarks that he takes his variant readings from Bengel and gives credit, too, to the three other writers we have mentioned. Then he adds:

It was a Doubt with me for some Time, whether I should not subjoin to every Note I received from them, the Name of the Author from whom it was taken: especially considering I had transcribed some, and abridged many more, almost in the Words of the Author. But upon farther Consideration, I resolved to name none, that nothing might divert the Mind of the Reader from keeping close to the Point in View, and receiving what was spoke, only according to its own intrinsic Value.<sup>18</sup>

Thus it is that Wesley admits plainly his dependence upon the other authors and his literal method of transcribing his borrowings. Nevertheless, one is quite unprepared by this to realize that Wesley has so changed his original purpose that there is hardly a word of his own in many of the notes. Some sections are almost word-for-word copyings. This is true not only for the exegetical materials where such wholesale dependence might the more be expected, but it is also true for the hortatory parts. A sampling of three chapters, Mt. 1, John 1, and Romans 9, indicates the extreme to which our author goes.

In Mt. 1, of approximately 104 lines of

commentary, all but some 14 can be traced directly to the four commentators. This means that, at best, only ten per cent of the material can be attributed to Wesley. We must not forget that he perhaps consulted other writings which went unmentioned. In John 1, there are about 196 lines of commentary, of which all but 37 are borrowed, leaving Wesley only twenty per cent. With Rom. 9, however, there is a radical reversal. Here, out of about 270 lines, only 70 are traceable at all to the four commentaries mentioned. The reason for this change is simple. Rom. 9 deals with the calling of God. Without exception Wesley's four contemporaries are good Calvinists at this point; while they favor the doctrine of predestination, Wesley is arguing vigorously against it. Almost all the material borrowed in this chapter comes from Bengel and is exegetical-critical in nature, not theological. If Wesley did borrow in this chapter from another source, it was strongly Arminian in character.

The decisions to borrow or not to borrow were also determined by non-theological causes. Everything of a purely critical nature was omitted. If Wesley spied a good point amidst a morass of verbiage, he took the idea and omitted the excess. By comparison, his own version is austere yet lucidly classical. Exegetical notes had to serve the purpose of explaining the ongoing narrative in order to be accepted. Hortatory notes are surprisingly few. The whole commentary seems to be weighted on the theological side, rather than on that of exegesis or exposition.

Yet Wesley strongly emphasized the historical meaning of the text, an emphasis which gives the commentary a distinctly modern flavor. This does not mean that the basic theological impulse is overruled; rather, the historical emphasis aids the theological goal by expunging all false, non-historical theologizing or allegorizing. In the first place, Wesley carefully explains the

historical situation in New Testament times. Such words as "Pharisees" or "Sadducees" are clothed with a suitable context. He describes well the workings of the Jewish court system, a description ultimately taken from the Mishnah. He gives enough background of the Herods so that one gets easily a sense of the drama of history. In the second place, Wesley is wise enough to recognize that not everything is meant literally. A "faith large enough to remove mountains" he accepts simply as a Jewish proverb rather than as something to be taken literally. The camel and needle saying is in the same category. When Jesus is driven "by the Spirit" into the wilderness, this means he is driven by a strong inward impulse. The logion about turning the other cheek is not meant as an absolute command, since Jesus himself broke it. Finally, Wesley is aware that some sayings of Jesus which apparently refer to eschatological events actually pertain to the coming destruction of the Temple and Jerusalem. The converse of this historical interest is a de-emphasis upon any allegorical understanding. Of the passages I have sampled, I could find only two allegorical interpretations. The parable of the Virgins is one; the other is, surprisingly enough, the saying of John the Baptist in Mt. 3:12: "Whose fan is in his hand, and he will thoroughly cleanse his floor, and gather the wheat into the garner, but will burn up the chaff with unquenchable fire." According to Wesley, the fan is the Word of the Gospel, the floor is the Church, and the gathering of the wheat represents the assembling of the righteous people in heaven.

At this point we can make at least a tentative judgment about the nature of the *Notes*. It is true to say that the commentary is composed largely of gleanings from the works of others. But it is also true that all such gleanings are consistent with Wesley's basic theological premises. I believe the evidence shows that the *Notes* are not a hodgepodge collection from men of various views;

rather, they are well-organized borrowings which have passed through the crucible of Wesley's insight. Where he could not agree with the commentators, he wrote his own notes. Thus there need be no hesitation in using the commentary as a vital source for Wesley's theology.

### *Christology and Anthropology In the Commentary*

If what I have said above is true, the "biblical theology" of John Wesley should also be investigated to see what fresh insights into his own theological premises might be gained. Of course the Methodist leader would have vehemently denied any distinction between "his" theology and New Testament thought. If a doctrine could not be proved from Scripture, Wesley was prepared to disown it. Nevertheless, the requirements of a commentator are sharply different from those of a writer of sermons, and when we turn from the sermons to the commentary we should very well expect to find not contradictions, but diverse nuances. Wesley's thought should emerge the richer for such a venture. Since we cannot attempt here even a skeleton of his biblical theology, it seems best to discuss briefly just two aspects of the interesting information the commentary provides us.

*Christology.* The main Christological passages in the *Notes* occur in the commentary on the Gospel of John. This section is a beautiful piece of theological writing, even though most of the ideas come straight from Bengel. The usual *Logos* theology is accepted. Wesley follows Bengel's view that the *Logos* is essentially to be understood in terms of Old Testament thought (Ps. 33.6, and in the LXX and Targum) and that its use in the New Testament need not be ascribed to any "heathen" writer, including Philo. In John 1:1, "The Word was with God," the preposition translated "with" is



*πρός*. This indicates, according to the *Notes*, both a distinctness of the *Logos* from the Father and yet a "perpetual Tendency as it were of the Son to the Father, in Unity of Essence." This sentence from the *Notes* is actually a direct quote from Bengel. Throughout, Wesley is arguing that the *Logos* is both separate and yet identical in essence with the Father. For instance, in 5:19 he comments that although the Son can do nothing of Himself, this is not His imperfection but His glory, since it shows a perfect unity with the Father. Wesley comments on 10:30 that the unity is not one of will only, but also of power and therefore of nature. "I and the Father are One" refutes both Sabellians and Arians. Throughout all the history of religions, only Jesus has claimed such a prerogative; "therefore if He was not God, He must have been the vilest of Men."<sup>19</sup>

The Incarnation is a gracious tabernacling of God among men. It is the amazing condescension of God. On John 1:14, "And the Word was made flesh and tabernacled among us," Wesley quotes a beautiful passage almost verbatim from Doddridge, a passage worth reproducing here.

The whole Verse might be paraphrased thus: *And in order to raise us to this Dignity and Happiness, the eternal Word, by a most amazing Condescension, was made flesh, united Himself to our miserable Nature, with all its innocent infirmities. And He did not make us a transient Visit, but tabernacled among us on earth, displaying his Glory in a more eminent Manner, than ever of old in the Tabernacle of Moses. And we, who are now recording these Things, beheld his glory with so strict an Attention, that we can testify, it was in every Respect such a Glory, as became the only begotten of the Father. For it shone forth not only in his Transfiguration, and in his continual Miracles, but in all his Tempers, Ministrations, and Conduct thro' the whole Series of his Life. In all He appeared full of Grace and Truth: He was in Himself most benevolent and upright; made those ample Discoveries of pardon to Sinners, which the Mosaic Dispensation could not do: And really exhibited the most substantial Blessings, whereas that was but a shadow of good things to come."*

The Atonement is a commission given to the *Logos* for our salvation, John 10:18. The *Logos* had antecedently the power to lay down and take up life—that is, he did not get such power from the commission itself. The commission, rather, was the reason why he used this power. He tabernacled among men in obedience to the Father. Wesley seems to see clearly the close relationship in John between unity of essence and obedience of the Son. His views on the Atonement come out most strongly, however, in connection with Romans. He holds strictly to the propitiation theory. God was offended, and the propitiation by Christ was required by an offended God. Wesley emphasizes that if God were not offended, Christ died in vain. Indeed, there was a real punishment inflicted on Christ in order that God's strict justice might be maintained. Thus the death of Christ was necessary in order to rescue our lives from the hands of an angry God.<sup>21</sup>

Since the Jesus of John's Gospel is largely the inspiration for Wesley's Christology, it is perhaps not surprising that Wesley does not always hold rigorously to the true humanity of Jesus. There are hints that at times Wesley came close to docetism. In John 8:59 the Jews in the Temple pick up stones to kill Jesus. John adds, "But Jesus concealed himself, and went out of the temple, going through the midst of them, and so passed on." Wesley accepts the view that Jesus probably concealed himself by becoming invisible and passed through them as if there had been no physical obstacle. This raises some doubt as to whether the flesh of Jesus is very real to Wesley. Another example occurs in John's account of the death of Lazarus.<sup>22</sup> Here Wesley essentially denies the human emotions of Jesus. On 11:30 he writes, "For the Affections of Jesus were not properly Passions, but voluntary Emotions, which were wholly in His own Power." On 11:35, "Jesus wept," he writes "Out of Sympathy with those who were in



Tears all around him, as well as from a deep Sense of the Misery Sin had brought upon human Nature."

In view of the above, it is at first surprising to find that Wesley had almost no interest in the miracles of Jesus, but the reason is not hard to find. Certainly one need hardly suggest that Wesley denied the miracles. The reason lies rather in the fact that most of the miracles *qua* miracles are of no use to faith. Here is a significant commentary on the practical bent of Wesley's religious thinking. Some miracles he passes over in complete silence. Others he comments upon only as they can be turned to the advantage of faith. One example occurs in Mt. 8, the story of the stilling of the sea. Verse 26 reads, "And he said to them, why are ye fearful, O ye of little faith? Then rising, he rebuked the winds and the sea." Wesley's comment is that "first, He composed their Spirits, and then the Sea." In John 5 is the account of the healing of the diseased man at the pool of Bethesda. The only verse Wesley seems really interested in is verse 15, at the conclusion of the miracle. "The man went and told the Jews that it was Jesus who had made him whole." Here our author includes a sizable paragraph on the fact that the Jews returned hostility to Jesus for his deed instead of thanksgiving. Again, the human response and reaction is central for Wesley, not the miracle *per se*. A final example can be taken from John 21, the miracle of the "big catch." The single comment Wesley makes is this:

This was not only a Demonstration of the Power of our Lord, but a kind Supply for them and their families, and such as might be of Service to them, when they waited afterward in *Jerusalem*. It was likewise an Emblem of the great Success which should attend them as *Fishers of men*.<sup>21</sup>

*Anthropology.* In one sense this is the area of Wesley's greatest interest and most significant contribution. Unfortunately, we have space to mention only a few of the major ideas. Wesley implies that Adam's orig-

inal state was not a perfect relationship with God since he interprets Rom. 5:21 to mean that grace could not reign before the Fall. From Rom. 5:14 and 19 he draws both the federal and the Augustinian views of original sin, views which had been united in English theology long before. There is some natural image left after the Fall, but Wesley proves almost more uncompromising on this than Paul. For Wesley, conscience is the weakest of all human attributes since the Fall.<sup>24</sup> When Paul says in Rom. 7:9, "I was once alive without the law," Wesley adds, "So I thought." When Paul in Rom. 2:15 says that conscience convicts or acquits a man outside the law, Wesley writes that it doubtless convicts much more than acquits.

One of Wesley's hard-fought points is that concerning freedom of the will. This is argued, among other places, in connection with Rom. 9, where he tries to remove predestination from Paul's thought. When God hardens whom He wills, this means simply that He allows those hearts to harden which have rejected his terms, that is, have rejected the free grace of Christ for all. Even Pharaoh had a chance to repent and did not. There seems little doubt that Wesley was fighting a losing battle; that Paul meant a real doctrine of predestination can hardly be denied.

The life under grace is a life under the moral law, now with the power to fulfill it. Good works are not the condition of justification; they are the result of it. Yet Wesley says quite positively that they will receive their own due reward. The Christian life is also a life lived solely for the kingdom. In reaction to the view that material results follow upon spiritual piety, Wesley comments on Mt. 6:33 that those who seek the kingdom first will soon come to seek it alone. His tendency towards asceticism leads him to try to read away the use of wine by Jesus. Yet he has to allow that in John's account of Cana, the Christ sanctifies society and does not reject it.

The inevitable question must arise sooner or later: Where does Wesley find support for his doctrine of perfection? The truth—and a surprising one—is that Wesley apparently makes little attempt to push this concept to the fore. Occasionally he does speak of perfection, but it is rarely clear whether perfection is meant to exist in the realm of history or in the time of the Consummation. One gets the impression that when Wesley wrote the *Notes* the assurance of eventual perfection was of more importance to him than the hope of its present fulfillment. This surprising lack of emphasis is clear in the translation and note on Mt. 5:48, where the King James text reads, "Be ye (ἵνα ὁθε) therefore perfect." Wesley, surely incorrectly this time, reads a simple future, "Therefore ye shall be perfect." The note does not speak about the necessity of arriving at perfection in this life, but rather about the fact that after the moral lessons of Chapter 5, Jesus gives a promise, not a commandment. There is no hint that Wesley thinks this perfection is to be attained now.

The book in which we should most surely find the doctrine of perfection is the First Epistle of John. Yet here again Wesley speaks with the greatest reserve. Even though he includes the subject of sanctification, he omits any discussion of perfection. It is the case that one can find here the Methodist leader's tendency to black and white distinctions. At his best, however, Wesley is describing with a challenging seriousness the image of the men we are meant to be in Christ. This lack of emphasis upon the doctrine of perfection is discernible with signal clarity when we turn to certain evidence given by Sangster. He has collected the thirty biblical texts which Wesley used most frequently elsewhere to buttress the doctrine.<sup>25</sup> Of these thirty, twenty-nine are found in the New Testament. But when we search the *Notes*, we find that only two of the twenty-nine are

used there by Wesley to speak of perfection. These are Eph. 5:27 and I Thess. 5:23. Whatever the reason for Wesley's refusal to discuss the doctrine in the commentary, it is at least clear that this refusal gives his theology, as seen purely from the *Notes*, a flavor clearly, if not sharply, distinct from the position he often maintains elsewhere. Here at least is an area, outside the province of the present writer, which might profitably be investigated by students of Wesley.

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<sup>20</sup> *Notes*, I, 321; Doddridge, *Expositor*, I, 9-10.

<sup>21</sup> *Notes*, II, 148 (on Rom. 3:25-26).

<sup>22</sup> John 11:1-44.

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<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, II, 142 (on Rom. 2:15).

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# The Gospels and Christian Ethics

EVERETT TILSON\*

**A**FTER indicating the inadequacies of many of the products of the endless quest for a New Testament basis for the Christian ethic, Amos N. Wilder proceeds to find a firmer and more promising basis for a distinctively Christian understanding of the ethical life in the kerygmatic approach.<sup>1</sup> Instead of the teaching of Jesus, in whole or part, or some special aspect of Pauline theology, this approach begins with "the essential revelation identified with the coming of Christ and his death and Resurrection."<sup>2</sup> It treats the entire New Testament, the Gospels included, as a theological unit.<sup>3</sup> Thus the ethic of Jesus as it finds expression in the Synoptics takes its place, along with the Pauline, Johannine and other versions of the New Testament ethic, within the framework of the kerygma of the post-Easter community.

To begin elsewhere in search of a basis for the Christian ethic would be, such writers rightly insist, to take a point of departure for which the New Testament provides neither precedent nor sanction. But the apparent assumption by certain scholars that the kerygmatic approach to the Christian ethic necessarily entails the repudiation of all other alternatives<sup>4</sup> truncates the kerygma in an utterly non-biblical and indefensible manner. Some of the more common approaches, though individually too narrow and restrictive to serve as an adequate basis of the Christian ethic, must still be seen as indispensable constituents or derivatives of the kerygmatic approach.

In this preface to the kerygmatic ap-

proach to the Christian ethic on the basis of the Gospels, I shall limit my concern to six considerations which, either because of their crucial importance or widespread neglect, seem to me to demand special attention.

## I

*Despite the centrality of Galilee, Calvary, and the Resurrection in the Christian kerygma, any narrowly Christocentric interpretation of the "Christ event," since it can scarcely account either for the origin or the impact of the Christian message, can hardly serve as the New Testament basis of the Christian ethic.* An instance of this tendency appears in Bultmann's view of "the kerygma of the earliest Church"<sup>5</sup> as the point of departure for the study of New Testament theology. Reginald Fuller rightly laments Bultmann's failure to take more seriously the problem of the origin of the kerygma of the Church.<sup>6</sup> If we are to view the Resurrection as an event in *Geschichte* rather than in *Historie*,<sup>7</sup> as Bultmann contends, must we not ask what it was that prompted the Jerusalem Church's resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth? Why did it not resurrect somebody else, say, John the Baptist? And why, in view of the gaping hiatus between contemporary Jewish messianism and the messiah of Christian fulfillment, did it cast its Christology in the mold of Deutero-Isaiah's Suffering Servant of the Lord?

The ascription of this identification to the theological genius of Mark, far from answering our question, forces us to raise the same sort of question at a further remove. What prompted the Markan tendency to identify Jesus of Nazareth as the Suffering Servant of the Lord?<sup>8</sup> And why, if, as form criticism would seem to show, Mark is based on old tradition and ecclesiastical interpreta-

\*EVERETT TILSON is Professor of Old Testament in the Methodist Theological School in Delaware, Ohio. This paper was read as part of a symposium on "The Bible and Ethics" at the 1959 meeting of the Southern Section of NABI.

tion,<sup>9</sup> the remarkable consistency in the resulting portrait of Jesus? Then, too, we must ask, why the remarkable consistency between this Evangelist's portrait of Jesus and the "Q" account of our Lord's version of the requirements of God? Did the interpreters re-write the career of the historical Jesus on the basis of a preconceived Christology? Or did their Christological interpretation come from contemplation of the career of the historical Jesus?

After making due allowances for harmonistic exegesis and apologetic theology, the weight of probability would seem to favor those who see the Christological interpretation as a derivative from historical fact. Since the Church could hardly have produced such a thoroughly sublime, consistent and unitary Christological pattern without the help of its demonstration in the life of a historical person,<sup>10</sup> we must find room in the kerygma itself for this important connecting link between event and interpretation of the mighty act of God in Jesus Christ.

If now we were to ask, From whom does Jesus derive the concept of his mission that prompts him to see his career as the fulfillment of God's promise to Israel?, we would be laying ourselves open to the charge of blasphemous curiosity. But the evangelists, blissfully insensitive to the qualms we have come to feel about any attempt to probe Jesus' self-consciousness, both ask and answer it with little hesitation and in no uncertain terms. They interpret his mission in terms of prophetic messianism.

Yet the discovery of evidence for the uniqueness of the career<sup>11</sup> of the historical Jesus does not pose for them a major problem in their attempts at the communication of the Gospel. What they are obviously hard put to it to do is to demonstrate from the Old Testament that this uniqueness has been thoroughly anticipated and predicted. They betray their difficulty on this score by their readiness to find Old Testament proofs

and/or prophecies of the messiahship of Jesus<sup>12</sup> in texts in which, in their original setting, the primary stress falls on the forthcoming action of the God of creation and/or the Exodus.<sup>13</sup> Just as prophets like Deutero-Isaiah sought to buttress Israelite faith in God's sovereignty over the future by appeal to the demonstration of his power in creation, so the early Christian evangelists appealed to God's disclosure of his plan for the life of Jesus Christ while it was only a hope for the future in support of their Christological interpretation of the career of Jesus, especially his baptism, temptation, visit to Nazareth, interview with the disciples of John the Baptist, passion and crucifixion,<sup>14</sup> after it became a fact of the past.

Even Mark's designation of his account of the life and work of our Lord as the "Gospel of Jesus Christ" probably derives from the Septuagint translation of the term with which Deutero-Isaiah describes the message of the one who announces God's forthcoming deliverance of his people.<sup>15</sup> Apart from this influence, the Markan account of Jesus Christ might have been called something other than a "Gospel," and the contents of this Gospel itself might have been quite different. If it had not been for Deutero-Isaiah's prophecy of the manifestation of the reign of God in and through the kind of life and death Jesus lived and died, would or could the early Church have seen in the life and death of Jesus Christ the crowning act of God?

If not, then the anticipation in the Old Testament of the disclosure of God's reign belongs as inseparably to the revelation of God in Christ and, therefore, to the Christian kerygma itself, as does the interpretation in the New Testament of its fulfillment. Therefore, instead of reducing the revelation of God in Christ, and hence the Christian kerygma, to event plus interpretation, we ought to speak of this disclosure, and hence the Christian kerygma, as anticipation plus event plus interpretation. Else



we tear asunder what was originally a theological and historical unit.

This broad definition of the kerygma, derived from and presupposed in the Gospels, implies at least two considerations of great significance for our approach to Christian ethics. For one thing, if we center the Christian faith in the Lord of all mankind, we shall identify those to whom we owe the debt of brotherly love in Christ on the basis, neither of their readiness or reluctance to close their prayers "in Christ's name" nor of their membership in or contempt for the little church around the corner, but of the Fatherhood of God.<sup>16</sup> Gregory G. Dix writes in support of this view:

When Christians took to calling Jesus Lord instead of Messiah, the Liberals, wrongly, supposed that they were 'heightening the Christology.' The point is that Jewish messianism does not yield a Christology of status in metaphysical terms—it yields a Christology of function in terms of history. But the function of the Messiah is undoubtedly a divine function, . . . namely his inauguration of God's Kingdom. The Messiah's action in history is God's own action.<sup>17</sup>

The God of our creation is identical with the God of our redemption. Therefore, if and when we define Christian brotherhood in such a manner as to exclude from the brotherhood of God the Redeemer those who share with us a common brotherhood through God the Creator, we repudiate the Christology of the Gospels and the Christian doctrine of the Trinity in one and the same breath. The central theological presupposition of the Christian kerygma compels us to say that men—all men—share a common humanity, a common neighborhood and a common brotherhood, irrespective of whether they presently do, or ever shall, share in common "one faith" or "one baptism" (Ephesians 4:5).

The foregoing definition of the kerygma has significance, in the second place, for our understanding of the relation between kerygma and didache. Once we combine C. H.

Dodd's discovery of the example of Jesus as an important source for the derivation of the didache of the Apostolic Church<sup>18</sup> with the recognition of the life of the historical Jesus as the connecting link between the Nazareth carpenter and the proclamation of the Church, we must disallow any neat separation of kerygma from didache, as if somehow they refer to two wholly distinct, self-contained and unrelated entities. Certainly we shall have to admit that kerygma and didache, before they were separated in analysis, were united in life, and in such a life as could reveal to us, simultaneously, both the character of the Demander and the meaning of obedience to his demands. By the same token, we shall have to counter the insistence of the thorough-going existentialist who, apparently unable to see any difference between God as Wholly Other and God as Indeterminate Being, talks about obedience to God as if you can have no idea of who God is or what he might demand until after he has spoken and you have done it. Such a person fails to see that he is denying not only mechanistic psychology, which he should, but also the fact that human knowledge of every sort, including whatever knowledge he may have of God and his demand, is mediated in one way or another. Though he may be justified in designating the revelatory deposit of the divine-human encounter as derived and secondary, he can hardly be excused for going on to dismiss it as unreal and/or inconsequential.

## II

*Despite the address of the appeal in the Christian proclamation to man as an individual, all(!) the Evangelists speak as representatives of a new society in the name of a societary person to candidates for membership in a social organism.* If Matthew, because he treats Jesus as the New Moses who gives the New Law for the New Israel, differs from the other Evangelists, it is only

in degree, since their Gospels, like his, are also the Church's Gospels. Since both of Mark's favorite messianic roles for the portrayal of Jesus' career, Son of Man and Servant of the Lord, have a societary reference in origin and application, he assumes the reign of Jesus Christ, whether by design or accident, as the head of a messianic community.

The Synoptics reflect such an assumption in their portrayal of numerous actions of Jesus in such a way as to suggest his contemplation of the establishment of a new Israel on the pattern of the Old Israel. These actions include his choice of twelve apostles, the instruction, possibly in imitation of Isaiah, of these disciples in his words and ways, the organization of a missionary journey and, lastly and most significantly, the inauguration in the Upper Room of the new covenant of his blood with a ceremony patterned, in all probability, on the rite used in celebration of the old covenant. Though we may question Jesus' anticipation of the enrichment and enlargement of his body of believers through the witness of these disciples in the interim between his public ministry and the final consummation, we can scarcely doubt the Evangelists' regard for the Church as the eschatological continuum in and through which God in Christ continues to work his transforming influence among men.

An especially relevant consideration in this connection derives from Matthew's setting of our Lord's version of the demand of God within the framework of the life of Jesus. Could this organization by the author of a Gospel, which included Didache, have been deliberate? Did the Evangelist mean hereby to suggest that the demand of God should have the same status in the Church in the interim between its present existence and the final consummation as it had in the life of Jesus between his baptism and the crucifixion? Certainly both Matthew's intended audience, the members of

the Church, and his version of the Didache, centered as it is in the unqualified recognition of the Lordship of God in Christ, would seem to call for an affirmative answer to this question. In fact, considering the tendency of all the Synoptics to describe the ideal life on the pattern of the lowly servant of the Lord on which Jesus cut the cloth of his ministry, apparently the Evangelists would have hailed Paul's description of the Church as the body of which Christ is the head. Certainly they believed that, just as a man's body serves as the vehicle for the communication of his total personality, the Church should serve as the vehicle for the communication of the total personality of her head, Jesus Christ our Lord, in and through whom God did and does act savingly in quest of those in need of wholeness.

The author of the Fourth Gospel gives explicit expression to such a view of the Church in his allegory of the vine and its branches.<sup>19</sup> If this figure has as its background the description of the head of the messianic kingdom under the figure of the vine, then the branches are to be interpreted, collectively, as the members of the eschatological community, namely the Church. Consequently, just as the branches derive their life from the vine of which they are members, so Christians must derive their life, i.e., derive their understanding of the meaning of life and then pursue it, from Christ their Lord. In other words, just as Jesus Christ served as the mirror and messenger of the divine will to and for the world, so the Church must continue to reveal and proclaim this same will through the Spirit, the medium of God in Christ's abiding presence and continuing action in the world.

The Evangelist removes any doubt as to the significance of this view of the Christian community for ethical thought and action in his version of our Lord's so-called high priestly prayer (17:1-23). This passage suggests that the Church should launch the attempt to define her obligation before God

and her responsibility to the world with the recognition that she and Christ together constitute the whole Christ. Thus the full conversion of the "world," i.e., men in organized rebellion against God, becomes the mission of believers<sup>20</sup> in virtue of its recognition as the purpose of God.<sup>21</sup>

### III

*Despite the error in the forecast by the Evangelists of the early end of human history, their concern for the future cannot be abandoned without doing violence to the kerygma and, therefore, to Christian ethics at any number of crucial points.* Any mystical or existentialist translation of eschatology into a parable of grace and judgment, largely devoid of continuity between past and future, calls in question, along with the Christian view of history, the ultimate meaning of human life and, still more seriously, the sovereignty of God. All of us, I take it, would see the tendency to identify God with any person, community or time as evidence of a shared sovereignty that blurs the Kantian recognition of the qualitative distinction between God and man. But must we not pass the same sort of judgment on the current tendency to separate God from any person, community or time?<sup>22</sup> Do we not as surely challenge the sovereignty of God by the denial of all continuity between present and future as we do by the denial of all discontinuity between present and future? Indeed, do not both tendencies spring from the movement from anthropology<sup>23</sup> to theology instead of vice versa? Or to put it differently, before radically demythologizing, drastically remythologizing, or even seriously expounding the eschatology of the Gospels, should we not seek, first of all, simply to understand it, and find out, if possible, just what ideas underlie the Gospels' representation of the future? This procedure seems to me to be so utterly basic and potentially fruitful that I shall suggest

three such ideas of special, if not indispensable, relevance for Christian ethics. They are, respectively: (1) history shall come to an end; (2) man must stand judgment; (3) God in Christ shall hand down the final verdict.

The description of history in linear terms can hardly be called distinctively Christian, unless it be clearly indicated, as Oscar Cullman does, that vertical intersections break the line at all decisive points.<sup>24</sup> The final such intersection marks the termination of finite existence on the plane of history. As opposed to the doctrine of the immortality of influence or any such social theory of human destiny, this cleavage stands for the impossibility of finding the meaning of history within the realm of humanity and finitude; or rather, that history, instead of coming to an end, shall be brought to an end, and by the same God, Creator, Christ, Consummator, who set it in motion.

The emphasis in the Gospels on the necessity of standing judgment for our deeds in the flesh bears witness to the continuity between divine and human decisions. Thus the Evangelists interlock the design of God as Creator, the revelation of God as Christ and the action of God as Consummator with historical existence and human destiny.

Though there can be no doubt as to the Evangelists' identification of Jesus with the Son of Man who shall come at the end of the age on the clouds of heaven, the question of just what they intended to say by this identification remains for us to consider.<sup>25</sup> At the very least, as Brown suggests,<sup>26</sup> they intended to say that the mighty act of God in the "Christ event" furnishes us with a decisive clue to the mighty act of God that shall usher in the final consummation.

If judgment by God in Christ awaits us at the end of history, then Christian ethics will need to take full cognizance of the futuristic dimension of the kerygma in its attempt to give structure to the concept of duty. Since the ought can never be defined

apart from reference to the end of the person who feels it, no ethic, least of all the Christian ethic, if it be devoid of eschatological wisdom, can possess true wisdom.

## IV

*Despite the stress on the future by the writers of the Gospels, a concern for the transformation of the here and now underlies their descriptions of the future.* They were evangelists in the popular as well as in the technical sense. Though the nearness of the end may have given urgency to their task, what moved them to write Gospels was a prophetic awareness of the nearness of the God with whom men in the end must come to terms. Therefore, even when they refer backward to the life of Jesus or forward to his return, they always do so in the hope of precipitating a crisis in the lives of their immediate audience. They write, as C. H. Dodd has observed, "not to unveil an inevitable future, but to alter the variable element in the present situation, the action of men, in relation to the constant element, the will of God, and so alter the resultant situation."<sup>27</sup>

The key element in their concern for the future is the idea of God, Lord of the present as well as past and future, that operates within it.<sup>28</sup> If the action of God in the future judgment will but finalize the response of men to the revelation of his character in Jesus Christ,<sup>29</sup> then men had better abandon the search for the good life, whether for man in society or for the society of mankind, in preoccupation with the stuff of time and history. If the meaning of history cannot be found elsewhere than in the character of God in Christ who, though he be the sovereign Lord of history, is also sovereign Lord over history, as the Evangelists would surely contend, then Christian ethics must treat the divine character as its source for the derivation of the promise of renewal and the threat of disaster. If the judgment of

God awaits man beyond history, Christian ethics must launch its search for meaning in human existence as if humanity had already ceased to exist. If in the end men must deal with God and with God alone, they should, in awareness of this fact, proceed to think, act and live accordingly.

## V

*Despite the legitimacy of the widespread fear of legalism, neither Jesus nor the Gospels suggest a precedent or provides much comfort for those who would dispense with the Law.* Though we may agree with Windisch that Jesus did not hesitate to prescribe ethical directives, we must resist his apparent tendency to turn the imperatives of Jesus into a system of case law.<sup>30</sup> The error in this assumption roots in the reading of Jesus' view of God from the perspective of a liberal bias. This approach, instead of viewing the God of Jesus as a Living Presence, reduces him to a block of solid goodness from which, with the help of a spiritual pick and a little pious mortar, we can build the ideal picture of the ideal person. It fails to see that Jesus, notwithstanding his readiness to issue imperatives, never betrays the legalist's preoccupation with mere formal consistency between statute and performance.

If Christian ethics would steer a middle course between this sort of recrudescence of legalism and the ever-present threat of antinomianism, it could scarcely do better than imitate the attitude to the Law that Jesus reflects in the Sermon on the Mount. On the one hand, as casually as if he were challenging the commands of a rank subordinate, he questions the inspiration, authority and finality of decree after decree in the Law of Moses. On the other hand, instead of proceeding to dismiss the Law, he adds to it certain other demands which, if and when obeyed, will fulfill the Law. These other demands come from reflection on the divine



will as intuitively grasped in personal encounter,<sup>31</sup> not from the study of Mosaic regulations.

Quite clearly, therefore, Jesus and the Evangelists, just as does Paul,<sup>32</sup> seem to have in mind two Laws. The first of these is the character of the God who, once he becomes to them an immanent Providence, compels them to recognize him as the ultimate norm and sanction of all their striving. The other is the outcome of this compulsion: the collection of the imperatives which, because derived from this revelatory encounter, will enable them, in some measure, to reproduce in themselves the character of the Revealer. However, since the God who thus reveals himself, simultaneously, conceals himself, and besides, is a living God, they must guard against the temptation to equate these two Laws. For just as the experience of God as immanent Providence forces them to recognize the necessity—and, then, to attempt the formulation—of the Law in this second sense, their experience of God as transcendent Judge keeps them from assumption of the possibility—ever!—of achieving perfect correlation between the Law of God (or its equivalent, the Law of Christ) and the Law of Moses, the Sermon on the Mount or, for that matter, any other historical body of so-called law.

If this distinction be a valid one, the relevance of it for experts in Christian ethics may be reduced, I think, to the simple imperative: "Go you and do likewise."

## VI

*Despite the directive character of much of the teaching of Jesus and the early Church, the very description of the Christian ethic as a kerygmatic ethic implies a persuasive rather than a coercive approach to ethical problems.* It is just here that the contrast between the prophets and Jesus comes into clearest and sharpest focus. Quite often, as if they believed men some-

how could live by a faith not their own, the prophets stormed the citadels of sin in righteous indignation, flaying the people who had broken with their (i.e., the prophets') faith for living by their own faith. Unlike the prophets, Jesus reserved his homiletical haymakers for audiences of the faithful; he upbraided only those who, professing to stand within the faith, belied this claim in practice. He loved the unlovely and worked acts of charity for the downtrodden and undeserving. He incarnated the love of God in life before the Church hailed it in the kerygma. Indeed, since the Church called for the imitation of his example, we can surely say that both Jesus and the Church conceived their mission to the world in terms of the role of the witness. So they witnessed, by life as well as by word, to the love of God.

As Gordon D. Kaufman has pointed out in the application of this insight to a particular ethical problem, the persuasive character of Christian witness does not necessarily entail compromise, as many would argue, simply because it permits ethical non-conformity and variety. "There is no room in Christian ethics for compromise, if by it is meant the sacrifice of the requirements of love. Love is just that which has resources to confront every situation with all its variety and in all its sinfulness. In dealing thus with every situation in its own terms, love is not compromising but being itself, radical, self-giving concern for neighbor."<sup>33</sup>

Thus Christian ethics has a better reason for being cautious in the multiplication of imperatives than the existence of a wide gap between the divine will and the human capacity to know it. She must avoid such coercive tendencies, as Kaufman notes, because her model is the God of Jesus, a God who, as he marches through the pages of the Gospels, "deals with men differently because His love adapts itself to the great variations in man's moral needs, moral insights, and moral capabilities."<sup>34</sup>

If this paper has in any way helped to make it clear that the content of the Christian ethic cannot be determined apart from the context of the Christian kerygma, I am gratified, but not from the conviction that such an insight represents an original contribution. In fact, I am inclined to think that the Evangelists themselves would be disappointed to discover that one could trace their interpretation of the Christian ethic to any other presupposition.

## REFERENCES

- <sup>1</sup> "The Basis of Christian Ethics in the New Testament," *The Journal of Religious Thought*, XV (1958), 137.
- <sup>2</sup> *Op. cit.*, 138.
- <sup>3</sup> E.g., see C. H. Dodd, *Gospel and Law* (Cambridge: University Press, 1951). Cf. L. H. Marshall, *The Challenge of New Testament Ethics* (London: MacMillan and Co., 1946), who, despite his title, makes a clear distinction between the ethic of Jesus and that of Paul.
- <sup>4</sup> E.g., Rudolf Bultmann, *Jesus and the Word*, trans. by E. Huntress and L. P. Smith (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1934), pp. 72ff., despite his emphasis on Jesus' demand for "radical obedience," finds little room in his ethic for specific ethical imperatives or unvaryingly valid ethical principles.
- <sup>5</sup> Rudolf Bultmann, *Theology of the New Testament*, I, trans. by K. Grobel (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1951), p. 3.
- <sup>6</sup> R. H. Fuller, *The Mission and Achievement of Jesus* (Studies in Biblical Theology, No. 12. London: SCM Press, Ltd., 1954), p. 15. Cf. Hermann Diem, *Dogmatik*, II (München: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1957), pp. 60-73.
- <sup>7</sup> John Macquarrie, *An Existentialist Theology* (London: SCM Press, Ltd., 1955), p. 160f. See also Alan Richardson, *An Introduction to the Theology of the New Testament* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1958), p. 119, who, though he implies agreement with this distinction in his interpretation of the Lucan Pentecost Story, proceeds to interpret the virgin birth and resurrection of Christ in such a manner as to leave you guessing just how far this agreement might extend. On the place of Bultmann's view of history in his thought, see Heinrich Ott, *Geschichte und Heilsgeschichte in der Theologie Rudolf Bultmanns* (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1955). Cf. Schubert M. Ogden, "The Debate on 'Demythologizing,'" *The Journal of Bible and Religion*, XXVII (1959), 17, who says that "it is . . . with the concept of 'history' that Bultmann's name ought properly to be associated." If true, Bultmann will be remembered for what he has been trying to teach us to forget!
- <sup>8</sup> Since a Gospel is, as R. H. Lightfoot has shown in *The Gospel Message of Mark* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1950), pp. 98-105, what it is because of its theological character rather than its historical reliability, the same question could be put with equal cogency to any other Evangelist.
- <sup>9</sup> Though Rudolf Bultmann, *Theology of the New Testament*, I, p. 3, draws a distinction between "the ideas produced in and by the Church" and "the editorial work of the Evangelists," the latter may properly be viewed as an extension of ecclesiastical interpretation.
- <sup>10</sup> Despite the assertion by Emil Brunner, *The Mediator*, trans. by Olive Wyon (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1947), p. 172, that "the Christian faith does not arise out of the picture of the historical Jesus but out of the testimony to Christ." Cf. Robert M. Grant, "Commentaries," *Interpretation*, II (1948), p. 454, who defines Christianity as "an historical religion, one built upon real events in a real history. . . ." See also Alan Richardson, *op. cit.*, p. 171, who writes: "The 'life' of Jesus, the only (!) historical life, is the one to which the apostolic testimony bears witness, and there can (!) be no other."
- <sup>11</sup> G. V. Jones, *Christology and Myth in the New Testament* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1956), p. 48, notes that in the time of Alexander Jannaeus about eight hundred men were crucified simultaneously, "but their deaths had no salvation-value."
- <sup>12</sup> Rudolf Bultmann, *Glauben und Verstehen*, II (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1952), pp. 162-168, notes that the early Christians, when hard pressed to explain the offensiveness of Christ's deeds, answered their critics with quotations from the Scriptures which demonstrated the foreordination of such events in God's plan of salvation.
- <sup>13</sup> E.g., see the chapter on "Jesus" in G. E. Wright and R. H. Fuller, *The Book of the Acts of God* (New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1957), pp. 236-256.
- <sup>14</sup> Oscar Cullmann, *Baptism in the New Testament*, trans. by J. K. S. Reid (Studies in Biblical Theology, No. 1. London: SCM Press, Ltd., 1950), pp. 9-22.
- <sup>15</sup> So Edward Lohse, *Mark's Witness to Jesus Christ* (World Christian Books, No. 3. London: Lutterworth Press, 1955), pp. 11-18.
- <sup>16</sup> The contrary assumption betrays a false view of the relation between theocentricity and christocentricity. Gustaf Aulén, *The Faith of the Christian Church*, trans. by C. H. Wahlstrom and G. E. Arden (Philadelphia: The Muhlenberg

Press, 1948), p. 65, says: "But when the work of Christ is conceived as the work of God, it becomes impossible to ascribe a greater degree of divine love to Christ than to God. . . ." D. M. Baillie, *God Was in Christ* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1948), p. 67, writes: "Whatever Jesus was or did, . . . God . . . did it in Jesus. . . ." See also C. H. Dodd, *Gospel and Law* (Cambridge: University Press, 1951), pp. 78f., who asserts that "the law of the new covenant . . . is the law of our creation, and its field of application is as wide as the creation itself."

<sup>27</sup> Gregory Dix, *Jew and Greek* (Westminster: Dacre Press, 1953), p. 79.

<sup>28</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 39-42.

<sup>29</sup> See R. Newton Flew, *Jesus and His Church* (New York: The Abingdon Press, 1938), p. 242f.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 251.

<sup>31</sup> As we are reminded by Ethelbert Stauffer, *New Testament Theology*, trans. by John Marsh (London: SCM Press, 1955), p. 204, anything less turns worship into "pious self-intoxication."

<sup>32</sup> Rudolf Bultmann, *Glauben und Verstehen*, II, 182, describes any attempt at the identification "des Gottesvolkes mit einem empirisch-geschichtlichen Volk" as an illusion.

<sup>33</sup> Is not the former as much a reaction against theistic humanism as the latter is an illustration of it?

<sup>34</sup> *Christ and Time*, trans. by F. V. Filson (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1951). Cf.

Robert M. Brown, *The Bible Speaks to You* (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1955), pp. 205-217.

<sup>35</sup> Provided we can agree, as I would, with Richardson, *op. cit.*, p. 204, that the Evangelists were fully conscious of the symbolical character of their language when they spoke of the Son of Man's movements on the clouds of heaven, etc.

<sup>36</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 208.

<sup>37</sup> *The Bible Today* (Cambridge: University Press, 1952), p. 131.

<sup>38</sup> Amos N. Wilder, *Eschatology and Ethics in the Teaching of Jesus* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1930), p. 129.

<sup>39</sup> Hans Windisch, *The Meaning of the Sermon on the Mount*, trans. by S. Maclean Gilmour (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1937), p. 43.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 44-123.

<sup>41</sup> As is said of Luther by Friedrich Gogarten, *Demythologizing & History*, trans. by Neville Horton Smith (London: SCM Press, 1953), p. 13, he derived his imperatives from "the faith which is directed towards the intention of God for man."

<sup>42</sup> C. A. A. Scott, *Christianity According to St. Paul* (Cambridge: University Press, 1939), pp. 43-46.

<sup>43</sup> "Nonresistance and Responsibility," *Concern*, VI (1958), 21.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, 28.

# Nicholas Berdyaev: Christianity and History

EDWARD B. RICHARDS\*

**I**N a world increasingly dominated by "mass" outlooks, theories, and plans it is important to be familiar with the philosophy of those who reaffirm the meaning and dignity of the individual. Perhaps the most stimulating feature in the thought of the late Nicholas Berdyaev is the fact that his philosophy of history defends the meaning of life in terms of the Spirit in the face of the modern secular emphasis on economic and material concepts as the essential realities of society. Although he used the dialectic to develop his philosophy of history, that philosophy was worked out within a religious framework, for Berdyaev was, above all, a philosopher of Christianity.

His whole outlook was conditioned by his interpretation of the meaning of Christ "in" history and the meaning of Christ "for" man's life. To Berdyaev history and Christianity cannot be separated because the relation of God, Christ, and man to each other gives meaning to history—and history gives meaning to their relation. This is not as paradoxical as it may appear to be at first glance.

Berdyaev based his philosophy of history on the premise that the Christian religion is essentially an eschatological religion since it confirms man's immortality and gives direction to his life in terms of an ultimate "other-worldly" goal. Life has a purpose, the denouement of which is in Christ, or the Heavenly Kingdom, or Paradise, or what-

ever term one chooses to use. Christianity sets up a relationship between God and Man. Life is the ontological manifestation of that divine-human relationship. History, Berdyaev continues, is the time-memory method in which and through which man works toward his destiny. Thus, the relationship between the divine and the human gives meaning to history, and history, by working out the divine-human destiny, gives meaning to the God-man relationship.

The philosophy of history is one of the ways to the knowledge of spiritual reality. . . . The philosophy of history studies man in the concrete fullness of his spiritual being; psychology, physiology, and other spheres of human knowledge study him incompletely in one or other of his aspects. The philosopher of history examines man in relation to world forces which act upon him, that is, in the greatest fullness and concreteness. By comparison all other ways of approaching man are abstract.<sup>1</sup>

The very substance of Berdyaev's philosophy is that man is a divine-human being and as such is endowed with certain attributes radiating from this duality that are not given adequate evaluation in this age of "collectivization" in one form or another.

Berdyaev arrived at the idea of God-manhood in a comparatively simple way. In brief his reasoning is this: because man is made in the image of God there is in that very image the presupposition of a close relationship to the deity. Since the relation between God and man flows in two directions, from God to man and from man to God, there is implicit in man's being made in the image of God humanity in God and divinity in man, with the preponderance of divinity being in God and the preponderance of humanity being in man. Christ, being both God and man, is the ultimate proof of

\* EDWARD B. RICHARDS is Assistant Professor of Political Science in University of Southwestern Louisiana, Lafayette, La. He has recently published articles on "The Soviet Press, the UN and Korea: A Case Study" (*Journalism Quarterly*, Vol. 35, No. 4, Fall, 1958), and "The Shaping of the Comintern" (*The American Slavic and East European Review*, Vol. XVIII, No. 2).



this divine-human relationship existing between the temporal and the spiritual.

Man's purpose in history is to exercise to the utmost the spark of divinity within himself and thus bring unity with God. The exercise or non-exercise of man's capacity for divinity is Berdyaev's Heaven and Hell. Berdyaev's ultimate philosophy resolves around man's fulfillment or rejection of the divinity with which God endowed man at the Creation.

In addition to the divine-human nature of man, Berdyaev's philosophy stresses man's freedom of action. Man is wholly, unconditionally and unequivocally free in his ability to subordinate his divinity to his humanity, his humanity to his divinity, or to harmonize the relations of these two aspects of his nature. The latter harmony is the ultimately acceptable relationship of man's dual nature to God. Berdyaev's philosophy of freedom is strikingly anticipated in the interview between Jesus and the Grand Inquisitor in Dostoevsky's novel, *The Brothers Karamazov*. The passage from Dostoevsky had tremendous influence on Berdyaev's thought. He constantly refers to it in his writings.

The insistence upon the freedom of man is derived from the Christian concept of God as love. Since God is love and love is the antithesis of force and/or hate, Berdyaev felt that there could be no possible use of force on God's part in the mutual striving for the unity of God and man.

This idea of non-compulsion in the Divine denies the Calvinistic conception of predestination. It is affirmed by Francis Thompson in the "Epilogue" to *A Judgment in Heaven*:

There is no expeditious road  
To pack and label men for God  
And save them by the barrel-load.

According to this interpretation of absolute freedom not only is "good" free but "evil" is free also. God desires man's unity with Him but man has a free choice to

make and this free choice is the basic element in history. Man, for Berdyaev, has thus far chosen to follow the lead of evil.

It is from within this philosophical framework that Berdyaev approaches the question of the meaning of history.

History is neither the scum of the world process nor the loss of all association with the roots of being; it forms a necessary part of eternity and of the drama that is fulfilled in it. History is the result of a deep interaction between eternity and time; it is the incessant eruption of eternity into time.<sup>2</sup>

Since man was created before history the clue to history is to be found in pre-history or celestial time and is embodied in myth.

Myth is reality immeasurably greater than concept. . . . Myth is the concrete recital of events and original phenomena of the spiritual life symbolized in the natural world, which has engraved itself on the language, memory, and creative energy of the people.<sup>3</sup>

The reality of myth raises the question of time and eternity. Berdyaev answers by rejecting the view that time and eternity are water-tight compartments. He distinguishes a true time and a false time. True time is a stage of eternity and is united with eternity while false time is not integrated with eternity. False time is the time of the "past," "present," and "future." These are constantly at war with each other. Berdyaev characterizes false time as that time in which the future is constantly revolting against the past, the past fights against being devoured by the future, and the present is in a state of constant annihilation. Such constant negation by false time destroys the meaning of history. Berdyaev is, accordingly, led to this proposition:

Historical memory is the greatest manifestation of the eternal spirit in our temporal reality. It upholds the historical connection of the times.<sup>4</sup>

Without memory and without eternity man can have only a meaningless futurism in which every generation is reduced to a sort

of compost with the sole purpose of fertilizing the future for the blooming of flowers which that generation will never see. For that matter, the flowers themselves might never blossom.

Now although ancient Greek culture succeeded in working out the conception of the immortality of the soul, it had no particular obsession for justice. On the other hand, "The Jewish people in their primitive conception of life were obsessed by the passionate idea of justice and its terrestrial fulfillment."<sup>5</sup>

This conviction of immortality within one culture and of justice within another achieved a certain culmination with the assertion of individual immortality by the Jews shortly before the advent of Christ. Berdyaev considered this very basic to the meaning of history.

I believe—and for me this constitutes the key to the whole historical destiny of the Jewish people,—that the Jewish consciousness represents the union of the aspiration to realize justice and truth on earth with that which seeks to achieve individual immortality.<sup>6</sup>

This union of the aspiration for truth and justice with the search for individual immortality accounts for the coming of Christ to the Jews:

Jewish religion is permeated with the messianic idea. . . . The expectation of the future Messiah and the passionate longing for His coming gave rise to that dualism in the Jewish religious consciousness which bound the destiny of the Jewish people to that of mankind.<sup>7</sup>

Christ came among the people who both yearned for the coming of a Saviour as a revelation of God in nature and combined justice and truth with immortality. The coming of Christ is, indeed, the most significant and far-reaching eruption of eternity into time that has thus far taken place in the history of man.

However, man's spiritual evolution was not sufficiently mature adequately to accept

Christ when he came. Many Jews were looking for a Messiah who would rule the temporal world by creating the Kingdom of Heaven on earth. When Christ preached a Kingdom of Heaven outside of temporal reality he was rejected. Nevertheless, the coming of Christ was "unique and non-recurring—the essential quality of everything historical. And it focuses the whole of world history."<sup>8</sup>

However paradoxical it may seem I am convinced that Christianity alone made possible both positive science and technique. . . . When immersed in nature and communing with its inner life man could neither apprehend it scientifically nor master it technically. This fact throws light on the whole of man's further destiny. Christianity had freed him from subjection to nature and had set him up spiritually in the center of the created world. . . . It made modern history with all its contradictions possible, because it exalted man above nature.<sup>9</sup>

The next epoch of history after Christ was the disastrous alliance of Church and State under Constantine which gave rise to the spiritual corruption of the Church. This entanglement and the decline of the ancient civilizations culminated in the Middle Ages. However, for Berdyaev, the Middle Ages was a period of concentration of the creative forces of man as reflected by the two disciplines of the monk and the knight.

In the Middle Ages man's energies were concentrated upon interior spiritual matters and were not sufficiently manifested in exterior form.<sup>10</sup>

In the philosophy of Berdyaev a balance is demanded between interior and exterior forms. God is not reached by exclusive concentration upon God. Rather, that goal is reached by man's maximum application of his creative energy to all phases of his being, interior and exterior. The general trend of man's thinking during the Middle Ages was toward the interior, thus subordinating man to God, to the virtual exclusion of man.

The culmination of the Middle Ages was the Christian Renaissance. The creative en-

ergies of man which had concentrated during the previous period now broke out of their confinement and were scattered far and wide. Man lost his center, progressively exhausted his creative powers, and surrendered all interconnection among his many-sided activities.

Science, art, political and economic life, society and culture now become autonomous. This process of differentiation is synonymous with the secularization of human culture. Even religion is secularized. . . . The bonds holding together the various spheres of social and cultural life now become relaxed, and these spheres become independent. That is the essential character of modern history.<sup>11</sup>

The Renaissance freeing of man from medieval bonds was accompanied by a fatal development in human history. In freeing himself from his former restrictions man, in the Renaissance, began to affirm himself anew. Man's self-affirmation was in terms of himself as a part of nature rather than as a part of the supranatural. He accomplished this self-affirmation without being able entirely to shake himself free from his Christian tradition. This meant that man "was severed from spiritual authority yet haunted by it."<sup>12</sup>

Berdyaev sums up man's predicament thus:

Man's self-affirmation leads to his perdition; the free play of human forces unconnected with any higher aim brings about the exhaustion of man's creative power.<sup>13</sup>

The Renaissance began the modern self-affirmation of man, and history since that time has continued the trend. The increasing impact of humanism with its accompanying withdrawal from God has brought man to his present confused, chaotic state. The early Renaissance contemplation of nature, at first an exuberant creative interest in art and science, was turned more and more to dominating and exploiting nature for man's own ends. This attempt together with its early successes was manifested in the Enlighten-

ment and the general exaltation of human reason. The belief in the power of reason tended to isolate man from God. It paved the way for the development of skeptical patterns of thought which proved self-defeating since they eventually caused reason itself to be doubted.

The crisis of modern history has been the advent of the machine. Berdyaev's own estimate of the significance of the machine illustrates his attitude toward contemporary historical development and its implications for the meaning of history:

The advent of the machine brings about a revolution in all spheres of life. It rips man away from the bowels of nature and changes the whole rhythm of his life. Formerly, an organic tie had existed between man and nature, and his communal life had been governed by a natural rhythm. The machine radically modifies this relationship. It steps in between man and nature; and it conquers not only the natural elements for the benefit of man, but also, in the process, man himself. It both liberates him and enslaves him once again. If man formerly depended upon nature and had, as a result, lived a meagre life, the invention of machinery and the resultant mechanization of life while in some ways enriching him yet imposes a new form of dependence on him, a dependence, perhaps, more tyrannical than that exercised by nature. A new and mysterious force, alien to both man and nature, now makes its appearance in human life; and this third, unnatural and non-human element acquires a terrible power over both man and nature. It disintegrates the natural human forms. It disintegrates and divides man so that he ceases to be the natural being he had been from time immemorial. It contributes most of all to bring the Renaissance to an end.<sup>14</sup>

Building upon this estimate of the influence of mechanization, Berdyaev shows how the humanism of the periods following the Middle Ages turned into anti-humanism by removing man from the center of the created world and making him a cog in a machine. This anti-humanist trend came to fruition in the philosophies of Friedrich Nietzsche and Karl Marx.

Of Nietzsche, Berdyaev comments, "After Nietzsche humanism is no longer possi-

ble."<sup>15</sup> Nietzsche proclaims the Superman but Berdyaev proclaims Man. Nietzsche's rejection of the man in whom Berdyaev saw the realization of human destiny is best expressed by Zarathustra:

The most careful ask today, "How is man to be maintained?" Zarathustra however asketh, as the first and only one, "How is man to be *surpassed*?"<sup>16</sup>

Of Marx, Berdyaev writes, "Like him (Nietzsche), Marx denies the value of the human individuality and personality, and of the Christian doctrine of the soul and its undeniable significance."<sup>17</sup> Marx certainly denied human individuality and personality insofar as they did not fit into his doctrine of the collective or class composition of society. Thus, "he preaches cruelty to man and one's next of kin in the name of the establishment of a non-human . . . reign of collectivism."<sup>18</sup>

Since all modern paths have been tried and found to lead nowhere but away from the ultimate goal of freedom, Berdyaev concludes:

We are entering the night of a new Middle Ages, in which a new blending of races and cultural types is destined to occur. The importance of the philosophy of history lies in the clue it provides of the destiny awaiting the peoples of Europe and Russia; and also of the explanation it gives of the decline of humanist Europe and the nocturnal epoch of history lying ahead of us.<sup>19</sup>

Once we accept this philosophy we are forced to the conclusion that the meaning of history can only be found beyond time, in the eternal. In other words, the ultimate significance of history is revealed when history is no more.

The end of history can come only through a Second Coming of Christ. Since a Second Coming will take place only through the strengthening and rejuvenation of Christianity, that faith must return to a Messianic and prophetic consciousness. It must attach

Christian symbols to social, political, and economic orders, states, institutions, and organizations in order to redeem from exhaustion man's creative powers.

While Berdyaev most certainly affirms man and his powers, the cornerstone on which his entire philosophy stands is God's place in the meaning of man's life. But the essential meaning of life and man's relation to God is put on an adult plane in contrast to the fateful reliance of the weak adolescent upon an over-possessive parent who not only dictates action but is supposed to resolve all the adolescent's dilemmas. For Berdyaev's whole point of view entails the rejection of any attempt to make God over into a paternalistic deity who must be constantly supplicated to insure that triviality may prevail or employed to vindicate the selfish and degrading behavior with which men afflict their fellows.

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# Two Basic Principles of Biblical Archaeology

LAWRENCE A. SINCLAIR\*

THE two basic principles, stratigraphy and typology, have been appearing with regularity in discussions related to biblical archaeology. To the person unschooled in the study of archaeology these terms hold little meaning. It is particularly important today, with the renewed interest in archaeology, that there be a sound understanding of these basic principles.

As a science archaeology involves the recovery of the tangible relics left behind by men of extinct social and cultural groups, and the study of their time and space relationships. In time, archaeology is concerned with a span from the first tools of prehistoric man to the relics of the American Indian, with its study extending to every continent. In its broadest sense this discipline is concerned with written documents and unwritten material, i.e., pottery, architecture, sculpture, weapons (stone, flint, and metal), jewelry, and cult objects. In the narrower meaning archaeology includes only the latter.<sup>1</sup> This excludes skeletal remains, the object of study for the physical anthropologist; flora and fauna, the object of study for the paleobotanist; climate, the object of study for the paleoclimatologist; and rock formations, the object of study for the geologist. All of these, however, help and are helped by the archaeologist.

As archaeological evidence has accumu-

lated in the last 150 years specialization and division of labor have taken place. Today we speak of this division in geographical or historical terms, i.e., classical archaeology (Greek and Roman), Hittite, Mesopotamian, Egyptian, Palestinian. There are further sub-divisions within the historical or geographical branches. The specialist may study architecture, pottery, coins, or inscriptions.

In the main, the archaeologist studies the technical aspects of field archaeology, the method of excavation<sup>2</sup> and, in some cases, goes beyond the simple description of his finds to interpret newly discovered data in light of results from other excavations in the same country or in distant lands. He will, of course, use his own skill in the fields of architecture, pottery, jewelry, etc., as well as that of the specialist. Comparative archaeological study has as its primary task the establishment of chronology.<sup>3</sup> Chronology serves the field archaeologist as well as the comparative archaeologist and the historian. It is the basic tool of the field archaeologist who works with chronology, relative and absolute. The comparative archaeologist uses it and redefines it as new evidence appears.<sup>4</sup> Moreover, chronology is essential for comparison of cultures as well as cultural phases within a limited area. It serves the historian in his reconstruction of past events.<sup>5</sup>

In our discussion we are not emphasizing the methods of excavation. There is already an extensive bibliography on that subject. We are rather taking the point of view of the comparative archaeologist. The task of comparative archaeology concerns the fixing of chronology. Of course, when there are written accounts by native historians, as in western culture from the Greeks to modern times, the task of establishing chronology in-

\*LAWRENCE A. SINCLAIR is Assistant Professor of Religion and Christian Education at Carroll College, Waukesha, Wisconsin. He did his graduate work under the supervision of Dr. William F. Albright at Johns Hopkins University and his dissertation, "An Archaeological Study of Gibeah (Tell el-Ful)" will appear during the fall of 1960 as an Annual of the American Schools of Oriental Research.

volves literary analysis. However, the archaeologist must turn to other evidence when written history does not exist. Various means can be used, depending on the country and circumstances. For instance, in America, particularly in the southwestern states, a continuous dendro-chronology has been carried back to about 1900 years ago.<sup>6</sup> Astronomical dating has been extensively used and is most effective in the Ancient Near East in the case of Egyptian chronology, which is almost exact (with a margin of error covering only a few years) back to the beginning of the 12th Dynasty at 1991 B.C. This accuracy rests upon the combination of astronomical evidence and dated documents. This leads us to our next example of material used in establishing chronology, inscriptions and documents. Mesopotamian chronology relies chiefly upon such material. Through the study of king and eponym lists, chronicles, and other dated inscriptions, scholars can date historical events within a century back to about the 24th century B.C.<sup>7</sup> Coins are very helpful for chronological purposes but limited to *ca.* 700 B.C. and later.<sup>8</sup>

Until about ten years ago the chronology of prehistory rested to a large extent on geology, but now we have the so-called "atomic clock," dating by radioactive carbon, C14. The method has not only been used to date prehistoric material but even to date linen from the Dead Sea Scrolls. Carbon counts have been taken of organic material from all parts of the world.<sup>9</sup> The limit to the use of C14 for dating is now about 70,000 years.

The dating of archaeological material may rest on some means other than inscriptions and reliefs. The latter are found abundantly in Mesopotamia and Egypt, but not so in Palestine. The comparative archaeologist has his own methods of fixing chronology, such as the use of pottery. The study of pottery chronology rests on two principles, stratigraphy and typology.<sup>10</sup> We shall discuss

these principles especially in the light of Palestinian archaeology.<sup>11</sup>

Stratigraphy is a geological term which refers to the stratified rock of the lithosphere, deposited in layers with a composition similar to the sediment now forming at the bottom of the ocean. Applied to the field of archaeology, stratigraphy is concerned with the recognition and inductive study of successively accumulated layers of occupational remains, which appear today in the Near East in the form of mounds varying in height and size. An over-simplified but helpful simile in describing stratigraphy of a mound is the comparison to a layer cake. The Ancient Near East, particularly Palestine, Syria, Asia Minor, and Mesopotamia, is dotted with artificial mounds or *tell* (Arabic plural of *tell*) which are formed of layered occupational debris.

A site for a town or fortress was chosen because of its proximity to fresh water and often because of its commercial or military importance. The first town may have met its end through war or natural cause, through destruction or abandonment. If destroyed by fire a layer of ash would cover the charred remains. Because the site was good, another city was usually built on top of the leveled debris of the earlier city. Such was the beginning of the formation of a mound!<sup>12</sup>

Not only mounds are stratified, but caves as well. Miss Garrod added appreciably to our knowledge of early men through her excavation and study of the strata in the caves at Mt. Carmel.<sup>13</sup> In America different levels appear in Indian mounds and recently there has been renewed study of the tumuli near Jerusalem.<sup>14</sup> A reminder to the reader that naturally the study of stratigraphy flourishes in the countries where the mounds and caves are located.

Typology (as used in archaeology) is the "... classification of objects according to types, following taxonomic methods. . . ." In contrast to stratigraphy, analogy and

comparison of forms are basic to the method. Typology is the study of the forms of pottery, sculpture, jewelry, etc. Jug is compared with jug, figurine with figurine, flint with flint.<sup>16</sup>

This principle appears to have been first used in Greek lands. Scholars, on the basis of detailed typological studies, have long classified architectural and sculptural techniques and motifs. In Egypt, likewise, typology stands at the foundation of archaeological investigation, with emphasis on prehistoric pottery.

Such a study has two sides, one to determine spacial relations, the other to develop time relations. Both involve the comparison of a style or type with closely related types. The forms or types for comparison, particularly pottery, may be taken from a given stratum or strata of one or different mounds in a narrow or wide geographical area. Very exacting typology has been developed for successive flint cultures. The archaeologist can now make comparisons on a very wide geographical basis, i.e., Europe, Asia, and Africa.<sup>17</sup> We may speak of a typological study of cooking pots from a particular stratum or period to establish their classification. Part of J. L. Kelso's and J. P. Thorley's study<sup>18</sup> includes the classification of pottery forms from Tell Beit Mirsim, Stratum A, in interrelated groups. On the other hand, we may speak of a typological sequence through successive strata or periods. Recently R. H. Howland's study of the lamps from the Athenian Agora<sup>19</sup> appeared, in which he uses a rigorous system of classification and comparison.

Archaeological stratigraphy and typology were first clearly recognized by Sir Flinders Petrie toward the end of the 19th century. At first his views were rejected by most scholars, but later confirmation from work at other sites, particularly in Palestine, led to a general acceptance of the principle of stratigraphy several decades ago. Petrie's

name will always be associated with the chronological use of pottery.

Thomas Jefferson is the first on record to describe archaeological stratification.<sup>20</sup> This appeared in his report of the section of an Indian burial excavated in 1784. It was left to H. Schliemann, however, to conduct the first excavation of a stratified mound. In 1871 he began at Troy (Hissarlik) to prove the accuracy of Homer. Unfortunately Schliemann was not interested in recording stratification, but his dig proved that layered occupational debris characterized mound formation in the Near East. Flinders Petrie, the archaeological genius who first recognized the importance of both stratigraphy and typology, was responsible for the excavation of the second true mound at the Palestinian site of Tell el-Hesi in 1890.<sup>21</sup> He excavated part of the 20-meter-high mound and synchronized some of his strata with Egyptian dynasties. Of course, his dates must be revised in light of new archaeological evidence.

The discovery that pottery could be used effectively for dating purposes was made by classical archaeologists, whose work culminated in the brilliant synthesis of A. Furtwängler.<sup>22</sup> He used only Greek painted pottery, ignoring common kitchen ware. It was Petrie who first recognized the importance of unpainted ware. In 1891, after the excavation of Tell el-Hesi, he said, "Once settle the pottery of a country and the key is in our hands for all future explorations. A single glance at a mound of ruins will show as much to anyone who knows the style of pottery as weeks of work may reveal to a beginner."<sup>23</sup> Ten years later Petrie published his scheme of sequence dating.<sup>24</sup> This system is based on a typological sequence of pottery. Petrie was faced with the problem of dating pre-dynastic tombs in Egypt. The first form used to establish typological sequence was a cylindrical jar with wavy ledge handles which Petrie observed were, in some cases,

fully functional while in other cases merely ornamental. Still other handles displayed stages between the two extremes. The end of the sequence was represented by jars found in tombs of the 1st Dynasty. He arranged the pottery of these pre-dynastic tombs according to typological sequence, assigning numbers to different stages, the earliest being S(equence) D(ate) 30 and the latest S. D. 80 (1st Dynasty). The intervals between the numbers are not, however, uniform. This is the best example of typological sequence without the aid of stratigraphy.

The principles of stratigraphy and typology are closely associated in the work of the field archaeologist. Their subsequent historical refinement has, therefore, depended upon the increased accuracy of the excavator's technique.<sup>25</sup>

It is the combination of stratigraphy and typology that makes it possible to interpret excavated material, as well as its relation to other archaeological finds. These principles must be used with care, for there are many pitfalls and dangers for the non-specialist. M. Wheeler has well said, "... the first rule about stratification is that there is no invariable rule."<sup>26</sup>

This does not mean, however, that we are powerless to formulate certain guiding rules. One such rule can be stated rather simply: in a mound the bottom stratum is the oldest and the top stratum the latest. The strata of a mound may be separated by plastered floors, by layers of ash as at Tell Beit Mirsim, or there may be no noticeable separation except a change in the color of the soil. Once we have established a rule we must recognize exceptions.

The strata of a mound never form flat vertical planes like those of a layer cake. Rarely is a town completely destroyed and completely rebuilt; rather, some buildings are repaired and reused. Buildings on the lower slopes are often contemporary with higher ones in the center of a town. One must be careful, for some strata are con-

temporary, others may be separated by a time interval or follow in unbroken succession, while still others may be disturbed by later builders digging foundations into the older strata or digging silos for grain.

The contemporaneity of strata can be recognized in the section. Wheeler describes a situation where "... certain strata cease toward one end or both, in such a fashion that the underlying and overlying layers unite to clasp them and hold them within a uniform mass, as it were suspension. . . ."<sup>27</sup>

An example of the failure to recognize a time-gap between strata comes from R. Macalister's work at Gezer. He telescoped the chronology of the Iron Age to fill an unrecognized gap between the tenth century B.C. and the Persian Period.<sup>28</sup> The excavation of the East Gate Area (Field I) at Shechem uncovered a pit sunk into older debris, where the builder "robbed" the stones from an old wall.<sup>29</sup> In any of the above cases a pottery typology is necessary to avoid stratigraphic error.

Usually a field archaeologist cannot excavate an area large enough to find the ends of suspended strata. It would, therefore, be necessary to study the material remains of the strata to correlate them. Macalister would have been more accurate if he had followed the pottery chronology worked out by F. J. Bliss and himself a few years before the excavation of Gezer. A good demonstration of the effectiveness of stratigraphy and typology when properly used can be seen in the work of W. F. Albright, H. G. May, and G. E. Wright in fixing the Solomonic stratum (VA-IVB) at Megiddo.<sup>30</sup>

Another point to be remembered in stratigraphy is that there is no absolute time-scale equated with the thickness of the strata. A. Evans attempted to establish the beginning of the Neolithic Age at Crete at 6000 B.C. by assuming a uniform rate of deposit. He argued that the Bronze Age covered 2000 years and since the Neolithic Age had more debris than the Bronze Age, it must have



had a longer duration. Actually the beginning of the Neolithic Age at Crete is dated in the fourth millennium B.C.

Before we turn to the study of typology and its relation to stratigraphy let us consider a special problem of stratigraphy, the dating of architecture. There are three categories of objects used to date a building or wall, those which are from the stratum before the erection of the structure, those which are from the stratum contemporary with the structure, and those which are from the stratum after the structure ceased to be used. In most cases archaeology uncovers objects from strata related to the structure. A recent discussion, centering around a case where this was not true, involved the dating of the temple at Shechem. The strata subsequent to and contemporary with the structure had been removed in an earlier excavation. G. E. Wright had to use pottery from the fill in order to establish the date of the temple. This was easily done, assigning the temple to Middle Bronze IIC. Y. Yadin suggested that the temple should be dated to the Late Bronze Age because, if the temple had been built in Middle Bronze IIC, the fill would have contained Middle Bronze IIB pottery.<sup>31</sup> Wright admitted that any building will be later than the fill upon which it stands, with "How much later?" as the major question in his mind. In this case no simple rule can solve the problem. The answer must come from other evidence, namely pottery recovered from the temple interior.<sup>32</sup>

This brings us to the typology of pottery and its relation to stratigraphy. Form is the most significant criterion for typology. As applied to pottery, technique (firing, paste, wheel or handmade, grits) and decoration (hand or spiral-burnishing, wash, slip, painting, incising, plastic ornament) are also important and, with typology, are basic for establishing relationship. The organization of a "pottery index" must be derived from careful study of significant types that are

both distinctive and occur within a limited time and space. This reduces the possibility of setting up erroneous schemes. Particular care must be taken, for example, with Iron I cooking pots from Palestine, which range chronologically from the fourteenth to the tenth centuries B.C.<sup>33</sup> Any such index must recognize that typological observations applicable to the pottery of one district or country are not necessarily applicable elsewhere. The wavy ledge handle is a case in point. It is found in Egypt and Palestine but there seems to be no direct connection between the two. Both are from different historical periods.<sup>34</sup>

When stratigraphy and typology are used together we must remember a fundamental rule often pointed out by W. F. Albright, "... that most of the intact or reparable pottery from a given stratum belongs to the last period before the destruction which brought an end to the stratum in question. The range of such pottery may, accordingly, be fixed as a rule within ten or twenty years."<sup>35</sup> He does add a note of caution to the effect that one must expect an occasional piece from older strata or earlier pockets or deposits of pottery. A second rule in connection with the use of typology and stratigraphy is that a group of types or an assemblage be recognized for each stratum.<sup>36</sup> Error originating in too much emphasis on a particular form would be eliminated, and proper comparison could be made with pottery assemblages from other strata within the mound and from other mounds.

Such comparisons are chronologically relative. When a stratum of a mound can be dated by inscriptions, foreign ware, or coins, then the pottery from this stratum is given an absolute date.<sup>37</sup> Parallel types from different mounds, besides establishing time relationships, also aid in determining cultural continuity within space.

The first example of a major archaeological publication making full use of stratigraphy and typology in Palestine was Al-

bright's *Tell Beit Mirsim*.<sup>38</sup> This study not only contains a detailed stratigraphic treatment of finds but a comparative study of all pertinent material. Dr. Albright has demonstrated, among other things, that the serious student cannot uncritically accept the absolute dates given by archaeologists for their material.<sup>39</sup> We must expect refinement of our chronology with the accumulation of new evidence; therefore it is necessary for the comparative archaeologist always to re-value older published material in the light of new evidence.

We end our discussion with another warning, sometimes referred to as the "law of the single sherd." One cannot build ancient chronology on the basis of one sherd. The comparative archaeologist is very conscious of the frequency of types in a stratum. Over-emphasis on a stray sherd would bring havoc to chronology.

With the establishment of chronological and cultural relationship the work of the comparative archaeologist ends and that of the historian begins.

#### REFERENCES

<sup>1</sup> W. F. Albright, *From the Stone Age to Christianity*, 2nd ed. (Johns Hopkins, Baltimore, 1957) pp. 53 ff. and *Archaeology and the Religion of Israel*, 3rd ed. (Johns Hopkins, Baltimore, 1953) p. 36. The writer wishes to thank W. F. Albright for reading the manuscript and for his many helpful suggestions.

<sup>2</sup> See Albright, *The Archaeology of Palestine and the Bible*, 1st, 2nd, 3rd eds., Chap. I (Revell, Chicago), *From the Stone Age to Christianity*, 1st or 2nd ed., Chap. I (Johns Hopkins, Baltimore), and Wright, *Biblical Archaeology* (London, 1957) pp. 23-27 for a survey of the history of archaeological method. The Wheeler-Kenyon method of excavation, not covered by Albright, is described in Wheeler, *Archaeology from the Earth* (Oxford, London, 1954), also Pelican Book (1956). At Shechem Wright used a modification of the Wheeler-Kenyon method, *Bulletin of the American Schools of Oriental Research* (hereafter BASOR) No. 144, pp. 12 ff. and *Journal of Biblical Literature* (hereafter JBL) Vol. 77 (1958) p. 42.

<sup>3</sup> G. E. Wright, *The Pottery of Palestine from the Earliest Times to the End of the Early Bronze Age* (Ann Arbor, 1937) p. 1 suggests that besides chronological considerations, pottery study will aid the students of ethnology and commerce. Particularly important for the study of the Philistines is Fürumark, *The Chronology of Mycenaean Pottery* (1941) pp. 121 ff. See the excellent article on the Philistine problem, "Archaeological Reflections on the Philistine Problem" by T. Dothan in *Antiquity and Survival*, Vol. II (1957) pp. 151-64; also Wright, "Philistine Coffins and Mercenaries", *Biblical Archaeologist*, Vol. XXII (1959) pp. 54-66.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Sir Mortimer Wheeler, *Archaeology from the Earth* (Penguin, London, 1956) p. 55.

<sup>5</sup> Albright, *From the Stone Age to Christianity*, 2nd ed. (Johns Hopkins, Baltimore, 1957) pp. 49 ff. The place of archaeology for the understanding of and the writing of biblical history has recently been interpreted by Wright, *JBL*, Vol. 77 (1958) pp. 39-51. Contrast Noth's (*Geschichte Israels*, 3rd ed. [1956] pp. 9-130) scepticism regarding archaeological data for the Patriarchal, Exodus, Sinai, and Conquest traditions. For a criticism of the Alt-Noth position, see John Bright, *Early Israel in Recent Historical Writing* (Chicago, 1956).

<sup>6</sup> Albright, "Ceramics and Chronology in the Near East", *So Live the Works of Men* (Santa Fé, 1939) p. 50, editor's note. Albright comments: "In most parts of the world, however, we seem to lack the material for a successful application of Professor Douglass' methods. Egypt and Mesopotamia are both devoid of sufficient rainfall to affect the growth of local trees appreciably. Imported wood, which is often remarkably well preserved in Egypt, comes from so many different districts in Syria and elsewhere that it appears hopeless to use it for dendro-chronology."

<sup>7</sup> See Albright's latest discussion, "The Bible After Twenty Years of Archaeology," *Religion in Life*, Vol. XXI (1952) pp. 537-38.

<sup>8</sup> In Palestine this date is lowered even more. The Shechem expedition found a Greek coin, the oldest from any location in Palestine, dated late sixth-early fifth century B.C. (*BASOR*, No. 144, fig. 6, p. 20).

<sup>9</sup> For the most convenient listing of radiocarbon dates and a discussion of the principles underlying the system see W. F. Libby, *Radiocarbon Dating*, 2nd ed. (University of Chicago, Chicago, 1955). Kenyon, *Digging Up Jericho* (Praeger, New York, 1957) p. 74 gives carbon dates for the Neolithic level ca. 5850 B.C., ca. 6250 B.C., ca. 6800 B.C.

<sup>10</sup> Albright, *From the Stone Age to Christianity*, 2nd ed. (Johns Hopkins, Baltimore, 1957) pp. 53

ff. and "Ceramics and Chronology in the Near East", *So Live the Works of Men* (Santa Fé, 1939) pp. 49-63; see also Burrows, *What Mean These Stones?* (1941) pp. 12-18.

<sup>11</sup> See Wheeler, *op. cit.*, who uses examples from his own work in India and England to illustrate his discussion.

<sup>12</sup> Wheeler, *op. cit.*, p. 22 defends as a basic principle in his method the study and recording of strata and deposits in the vertical section of an excavated area.

<sup>13</sup> D. A. E. Garrod and D. M. A. Bate, *The Stone Age of Mount Carmel* (Oxford, 1937).

<sup>14</sup> See R. Amiran, *Israel Exploration Journal* (hereafter *IEJ*) 8 (1958) pp. 205-227.

<sup>15</sup> Albright, *From the Stone Age to Christianity*, 2nd ed., p. 53.

<sup>16</sup> Compare the limited definition in *Harper's Bible Dictionary* (New York, 1958) p. 572.

<sup>17</sup> See Braidwood, *Prehistoric Men*, 2nd ed. (Chicago, 1951) and Albright, *Archaeology of Palestine*, Chap. 3, Pelican (1956).

<sup>18</sup> Kelso and Thorley, *Annual of the American School of Oriental Research* (hereafter *AASOR*) XXI-XXII, pp. 86-142.

<sup>19</sup> Howland, *The Athenian Agora. V. The Greek Lamps and Their Survivals* (Princeton, 1958).

<sup>20</sup> Wheeler, *op. cit.*, pp. 58-9 and references there cited.

<sup>21</sup> Petrie, *Tell el Hesi* (London, 1891).

<sup>22</sup> Albright, *op. cit.* (note 6) p. 53. See A. Furtwängler and K. Reichhold, *Griechische Vasenmalerei* (1910-1932).

<sup>23</sup> Petrie, *op. cit.*, p. 40. Much skepticism about the use of pottery for chronological purposes was expressed by Conder and Nowack; see Albright's comment, *Archaeology of Palestine and the Bible*, 3rd ed. (Revell, Chicago, 1935) pp. 25, 181, and n. 18.

<sup>24</sup> Petrie, *Diospolis Parva* (London, 1901).

<sup>25</sup> The history of archaeological method in Palestine has often been recapitulated. See references in note 2 above and Wright, *JBL*, Vol. LXXVII (1958) pp. 39-40. For the most recent discussion of his new stratigraphic method, see Wheeler, *op. cit.*, Chap. 2.

<sup>26</sup> Wheeler, *op. cit.*, p. 62.

<sup>27</sup> Wheeler, *ibid.*, p. 61.

<sup>28</sup> Albright, *AASOR*, XXI-XXII, pp. 29 and 62. There was an Assyrian villa at Gezer in the seventh century B.C. At Jericho Kenyon (*Palestine Exploration Quarterly* [hereafter *PEQ*] 1954, p. 55) describes an accumulation of a "turf?" layer between the Neolithic pottery levels and those of the Early Bronze Age, indicating a gap during the Chalcolithic Period. Zeuner (*PEQ*, 1954, pp. 64-8) reports on the analysis of samples from

this layer, establishing the presence of a soil. Zeuner's (*ibid.*, p. 64) description of three ways in which occupational gaps of a mound can be identified prevents us from drawing hasty conclusions in regard to such accumulations. Moreover, the depth of soil does not help in determining the length of the gap. This must rest on archaeological and stratigraphical evidence (Kenyon, *Digging Up Jericho*, N.Y., 1957, pp. 93-102; cf. Zeuner, *op. cit.*).

I wish to thank Dr. H. Neil Richardson for calling this to my attention.

<sup>29</sup> *BASOR*, No. 148, p. 19, Sec. A-A, marked "robber pit".

<sup>30</sup> Albright, *American Journal of Archaeology*, Vol. 44 (1940) pp. 546-50 and Albright, *AASOR*, XXI-XXII, p. 2, n. 1 and p. 29, n. 10; May, *JBL*, LXIII (1944) pp. 191-2; Wright, *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, Vol. 70 (1950) pp. 56-60. Cf. Yadin, *BA*, XXIII, pp. 62-8.

<sup>31</sup> *BASOR*, No. 150, p. 34.

<sup>32</sup> *BASOR*, No. 150, pp. 34-5.

<sup>33</sup> Albright, *op. cit.* (note 6) pp. 58-9; see also his comments on the use of typology by Dörpfeld, Petrie, and Vincent.

<sup>34</sup> Albright, *ibid.*, pp. 59-60.

<sup>35</sup> Albright, *AASOR*, XXI-XXII, p. 2, n. 1 and p. 6, n. 2. See Aharoni and Amiran's (*IEJ*, 8, pp. 171-84) and Wright's (*BASOR*, No. 155, pp. 13-29) application of this rule in criticism of *Samaria-Sebaste* III.

<sup>36</sup> Braidwood, *Prehistoric Man* (Chicago, 1951) pp. 11-13.

<sup>37</sup> Wheeler, *op. cit.*, p. 143 notes that in some cases dated pottery with a limited durability is better evidence than coins with a longer rate of survival.

<sup>38</sup> The reports of the excavations at Tell Beit Mirsim appeared in the *Annual of the American Schools of Oriental Research*, Vols. XII, XIII, XVII, and XXI-XXII.

The appearance of Vols. XII and XIII was epoch-making in Palestinian archaeology. Until their publication the pottery chronology of Palestine could be described as utterly confused. Moreover, only a few foreign archaeologists residing in Palestine had sufficient knowledge to coördinate its pottery. Today these volumes are the basic handbook of the student of Palestinian archaeology.

<sup>39</sup> Schaeffer, *Stratigraphie comparée et chronologie de l'Asie occidentale (III<sup>e</sup> et II<sup>e</sup> millénaires)* (London, 1948) has tried to apply the principles of stratigraphy and typology. His work is only partly successful because he relies on the dates given by the excavators and seldom attempts to evaluate the archaeological evidence in the light of the principles he is using.

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## Book Reviews

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### PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY

*The Degrees of Knowledge.* By JACQUES MARITAIN, tr. by Gerald B. Phelan. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1959. xix + 476 pages. \$7.50.

When Jacques Maritain in 1932 entitled his major work, *Distinguer pour unir, ou Les degrés du savoir*, he gave the guiding and unifying theme of what must be set down as one of the most masterful philosophical systems of our time. This is not an exposition of great Thomistic themes related to, and synthesized with, the contributions of St. John of the Cross, though it is these. It is, stage by stage, a massive and thorough presentation of momentous and historic philosophical themes in a way which brings out their relevance to recent and contemporary scientific, philosophical, and theological issues.

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The scholarly world, philosophical and theological, may therefore rejoice that Gerald Phelan directed, supervised, and revised the fourth French edition of this work, including the Appendices of the first edition. Maritain, in a glowing "Foreword," expresses his satisfaction with this "genuine translation, performed with competent schol-

arship and a constant concern for accuracy." Agreement aside, so capable, comprehensive, and so stimulating a philosophical masterpiece deserved nothing less. We also thank Charles Scribner's Sons for making such a work handsomely available at a comparatively reasonable price.

PETER A. BERTOCCI

Boston University

*The Word Incarnate.* By W. NORMAN PITTINGER. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959. xxiii + 295 pages. \$7.50.

This discussion, subtitled "A Study of the Doctrine of the Person of Christ," is an outstandingly clear and significant expression of the purpose of the series of volumes of which it is one, *The Library of Constructive Theology*, as that purpose is stated by The Editors in a General Introduction here given. They declare that in our time "something more is needed than a defense of propositions already accepted on authority, for the present spiritual crisis is essentially a questioning of authority, if not a revolt against it. . . . Nothing less is required than a candid, courageous, and well-informed effort to think out anew, in the light of modern knowledge, the foundational affirmations of our common Christianity. This the aim of every writer in this series." This volume certainly belongs in such a series.

There are three basic aspects in this discussion by Dr. Pittenger, but they are so closely interwoven that it is not possible to make a sharp division of the material. The first phase is the critically-determined historical basis of Christological thinking, the second a critical-historical study of this





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thinking, and the third, critically-determined conclusions. It is our author's conviction that any attempt of any school to give precise description of the "pragmatic or existential character of the Christian religion . . . will always refer to Jesus Christ as the central figure; he will always be the focal point in the definition, . . . and that will involve the affirmation that He, the true Man in whom God dwells and through whom He acts constitutes the real abiding center of that life and experience."

Elaborating this fundamental affirmation the author declares that in the attempt to find the true historical basis of Christian thinking, one must take the New Testament as an overall picture, and must not extract certain select verses which he regards as particularly favorable to his own thinking. It is also imperative that one interpret the material with the meaning which the language had for the original reporter and those to whom he was giving his report. Moreover, it must be recognized that in the first days of the Christian movement there was a period of oral transmission of the story, and that inevitably the faith of the reporter would have some effect upon the stories he told, and naturally not all of the stories are precisely alike. He further declares that in all early Christian thinking it is evident that the manifestation of the living Christ in their own experience was the decisive factor in the total story.

Closely tied in with his carefully prepared report of the thinking disclosed in the New Testament is Dr. Pittenger's comparatively brief but illuminating discussion of the Christological thinking of the early Christian centuries, the period of "classical Christology." He moves on to give much more attention to the Reformation and Post-Reformation periods, and here presents extended critical discussion of a number of modern Christologies, down to our own time. He thinks that "the language that has been used about Jesus Christ has almost consistently

been such that he has been made to look like an 'intrusion' or 'eruption' from outside into the sphere of human life and experience. . . . As a result he has become an almost meaningless prodigy, catastrophically introduced into the world from the outside, rather than the culmination and coronation of a movement from God to man which is the proper invitation to and explanation of man's returning movement to God." Of our contemporaries, Karl Barth and Emil Brunner come in for special attention and disapproval. He pointedly declares that "the affirmation of Barth that God and man are so essentially unrelated and unrelatable that God cannot make any revelation to man, but must make it in Christ in his divine reality and spirit is utterly false and must be emphatically rejected." The essence of the thinking of Brunner that the historical figure of Jesus is not a part of the picture, that his only significance is that he is the manifestation of the Word of God, and like a bolt out of the sky makes atonement for man in some way wholly unrelated to man, seems to Pittenger to "crystallize an irrational philosophy, a skeptical epistemology, and a dualistic theology."

In his major emphases in his presentation of New Testament thinking, Dr. Pittenger seems to be on incontrovertible ground. But in the general context of that part of his discussion he presents certain opinions that will be unacceptable to many of his readers. Notably, he says that "the virginal conception of Jesus is of legendary character in which the actuality of God in bringing Jesus into the world is not scientifically based and affirmed, but is poetically expressed. . . . The story of the empty tomb is not the affirmation of the basic fact, but is a way of affirming the living personal reality of Jesus and his creative relationship to the primitive Christian community. . . . The eschatology of the first Christians is not to be taken literally but is to be understood as poetical in character."

He also at times uses a descriptive term or phrase which has natural implications that he can hardly have meant to express. But a single example can here be cited. In his discussion of The Incarnation and The Trinity—chapter IX—he declares his conviction that “the doctrine of the Trinity was developed in the effort to account for and develop the stupendous fact of Christian life in the faith of Christ.” In unfolding the meaning of this, he asserts the Divine Reality . . . the Selfexpression . . . or Word . . . or Son, and the response or Holy Spirit.” If the word “Response” here carries its ordinary meaning, it is basically inadequate. However, in an earlier part of this same discussion he speaks of the Holy Spirit as “God in us . . . inspiration, inward power, love, joy, peace, and other fruits of the Spirit”: these must be what he thinks of as he speaks of “Response.”

But even with these specifically mentioned and other such restrictions, all readers will recognize that we have here the thinking of an earnest, honest, outstanding scholar and challenging exponent of our basic Christian convictions.

JOHN W. BAILEY

Professor Emeritus

Berkeley Baptist Divinity School

*Lordship and Discipleship.* By EDWARD SCHWEIZER. Naperville: Alec R. Allenson, Inc., 1960. 127 pages + indices. \$2.25.

Edward Schweizer published “Erniedrigung und Erhöhung bei Jesus und seinen Nachfolgern” in 1955, and it was reviewed by me in this Journal in the July issue of 1956. According to his own words, he has “entirely revised” the German original and now gives us an English version. He has omitted some of the technical questions of exegesis, reduced somewhat the space formerly accorded to Hellenism, expanded his treatment of Paul, and added a brief chapter

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Other articles in the Autumn issue of *Religion in Life* include: *Higher Education and Values* by Nels F. S. Ferré, *Demythologizing and Jesus* by Thomas J. J. Altizer, *The Cardinal Dogma of Religious Existentialism* by Warren Steinkraus, and *The Role of Self-Interest in Politics* by Don K. McKee.

An article by Peter A. Bertocci, Borden Parker Bowne Professor of Philosophy at Boston University, notes the 100th anniversary of Bowne. The 400th anniversary of the Dutch theologian Arminius is noted by *The Life and Thought of Jacob Arminius* by G. J. Hoenderdaal and *Arminianism in England* by Owen Chadwick.

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(ch. 13). The English version also omits the appendix on the "Uppsala-Schule," and some changes are made in the remaining appendices. The general reorganization of the body of the essay is clearly outlined at the conclusion of the preface. Of course, the principal thesis of "Lordship and Discipleship" remains that found in the German original: to explore in depth the concept of discipleship as it stands in integral relation to the words of Jesus and to the Christ of faith, both in his humiliation and exaltation.

Some of the questions posed in my previous review must again be raised, and others added to them. Do theological presuppositions in the last analysis govern exegetical considerations? If so, to what degree? Or again, is a consistent methodology employed in exegesis? And are the inferences Schweizer draws from his exegesis the only possible ones to be drawn?

The word "follow," Schweizer tells us, is found in the New Testament only in connection with the relationship to the earthly Jesus—with the exception of Revelation 14:4. From this verbal analysis he blandly infers that, "This shows how realistically concrete this whole concept of following Christ was to the Church" (p. 12). But does this conclusion necessarily follow from such a narrow base as that afforded by consideration of word usage? May there not be other reasons why the word "follow" was used only in connection with the earthly Jesus beside that suggested by Schweizer? Furthermore, if word usage is so important at this point, why should he, after admitting that Mark 10:21 may not be a genuine statement of Jesus, place as much emphasis as he does on the passage and others of similar dubiety (p. 14, 18)?

When the author summarizes his study of Jesus' words on discipleship, we are again treated to over-confident conclusions based on inconsistency of treatment (p. 20). According to Schweizer, Jesus called men to

follow him, and this allegiance Jesus regards as the decisive act. But this simply is not the case, especially in the period prior to Caesarea Philippi, when the emphasis was placed on decision and repentance in view of the coming Kingdom. Again, Schweizer maintains that discipleship "entails giving up all other ties, to boat and tax-office, to father and mother, in short to his own life, to oneself." Within a few lines, however, we find him saying, "It is evident that Jesus by no means called all those who wanted to obey him to that outward discipleship which implied the abandoning of family and occupation." Here a distinction in discipleship is introduced, not otherwise discussed, which contradicts the former assertion about the nature of discipleship.

In treating Peter's sermons in Acts, we find again a type of vulnerable thinking which is forced upon Schweizer by his efforts to produce a more consistent view of the early church's concept of Jesus than the materials permit. "It cannot be disputed that he (Peter) has used ancient materials . . . even though we are no longer able to verify to what extent" (p. 32). If we cannot verify "to what extent," how can we assume as being beyond dispute that there is ancient material embodied in Peter's sermons? Nor can we be more confident of Schweizer's conclusion that the early church saw Jesus as the Righteous One of Jewish thought when, after his previous emphasis on verbal usage, we find him saying, "Though the title 'Righteous One' is virtually absent from the Synoptic tradition, there is no doubt that the early church has seen Jesus in the character of the Righteous One suffering in obedience" (p. 33). Maybe the early church had as good a reason for not using the title as it did for using the word "follow" in the reference given above.

One last example of the methodological and logical problems raised by Schweizer's monograph may be discovered in this pas-



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sage, which bristles with exegetical and theological issues. "If Jesus did foresee suffering and rejection for himself and his disciples, then, of course, he saw it not as a catastrophe, but as a gateway to the glory of the coming Kingdom . . . he must in fact have expected something like his exaltation to the presence of God" (p. 36). At what stage of his career did Jesus foresee, *if he did*? Why "*of course*" did he see rejection not as catastrophe but as a "gateway" to the Kingdom? Is the textual evidence sufficiently strong to support Schweizer's theological assumption that Jesus optimistically interpreted his rejection and crucifixion? And what solid textual basis is there for assuming Jesus expected "exaltation?"

By these negative critical remarks I have attempted to underline a major problem in contemporary biblical theology, i.e., the need for a consistency in methodology and a sharper attention to the logical transitions by which the scholar moves from exegesis to theological affirmation. Sometimes an inversion of outlook takes place by which an inconsistent or erratic use of methodology is pressed into service to yield a consistency of interpretation when the materials themselves rebel against such treatment. No citations of scholarly opinion or use of such phrases as "it cannot be doubted" can make good for evidence or the lack thereof.

In spite of Schweizer's tendency to allow his theological leanings to sway his exegesis, and his sometimes carelessly drawn inferences, his book is in the main a thorough and workmanlike piece. He knows his material. He sees both the variety and unity in the New Testament conceptions of Jesus. His chapter ten is an excellent summary of the unity within the New Testament confessions about Jesus, while the succeeding chapter pays full tribute to the variations on the theme of Christ, humiliated and exalted. There are insights in profusion on these pages, and the technical apparatus will not

discourage the scholar from drawing upon them.

CLYDE A. HOLBROOK

*Oberlin College*

*The Rule of God. Essays in Biblical Theology.* By G. ERNEST WRIGHT. Garden City: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1960. viii + 133 pages. \$2.95.

Seven lectures to clergymen and theological students in various places, finally delivered in present form as the Carnahan Lectures at the Facultad Evangélica de Teología, in Buenos Aires, are now published as the seven chapters of *The Rule of God*. It is not surprising to find the chapters only loosely related. Yet the title does accurately identify a connecting theme.

Wright vigorously contrasts the vague and sentimental ideas of God which he finds dominant in the present church with the particular individual identity of God as He is represented in the Bible. Even serious modern thought finds the biblical view hard to accept, he tells us, some philosophers conceiving God in generalized abstractions and Tillich in symbols which lack the definiteness of "the Biblical Lord of history, the Definite One, who alone can produce faith and obedience" (p. 19).

The author is to be applauded for the clarity and forthrightness of this much-needed teaching. Men are not likely to find their way to God by following such abstract and equivocal signposts as have been set up all around us as substitutes for biblical personalism. God is not a general spirit of love or "beautiful ideal" (p. 5), but the living individual Creator and Lord.

The exposition of Genesis 3 is persuasive and sound in describing the account of the Fall as intended originally, not as a statement of historical facts, but as response to the question why man "finds himself with history in such a miserable state" (p. 26). The treatment of the account by present

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theologians as a searching, truth-disclosing myth is not, then, a modernist perversion of Scripture to make it conform to modern ideas, but a return to the original purpose—excepting that we know we are *not* here dealing with history, while the ancient writers did not even raise our questions about historical fact.

The chapter on "Individual and Community" seeks to correct the mistaken one-sided individualism of much current Protestant thought. Wright's basic position here is sound and his statement of it useful. I should only want to add that at one point he has left himself open to misunderstanding by the way he has put the limitation on individualism. "Man the individual," says the author, "is called to obedient service, not in order that he himself can be God . . ." (p. 45). Here the emphasis is misleadingly placed. The community, even the church, must no more than the individual attempt to be God. Precisely such social idolatry is a special temptation and danger in our time, and even the church is subject to it. Wright further encourages the mistaken interpretation when he says explicitly that the community of faith is "the body of Christ" and "the body of Christ is Christ himself" (p. 46)! It would be better to stand by his later, correctly biblical teaching that Christ is "the head" of the body (p. 46). Churchmen are corporately all too susceptible to the temptation to think they are privileged to play God, without encouragement by biblical theologians.

Above all, this reviewer welcomes and commends the strong insistence, dominant in the last four chapters, that there is no security without obedience and that any religiousness without obedience is utterly false. The source of all virtues is God and we must wait humbly on Him for faith, hope, and love. But without these gifts professed faith is only false prophecy and no way of salvation. In a day when theological,

homiletical, and liturgical evasions of this divine requirement are being offered on all sides, this strong prophetic warning is especially timely.

L. HAROLD DEWOLF

*Boston University*


*Jung and St. Paul.* By DAVID COX. New York: Association Press, 1959. 357 pages. \$5.75.

Because of the current interest in analytical psychology and resurgence of biblical theology this book has a lot to commend it to ministers, religious education workers, counsellors, and practicing psychologists. The author says that there is much in common between religion and modern psychotherapy. He states that he began his comparative study of C. G. Jung's system of salvation, or "individuation," and St. Paul's way of salvation, through justification by faith, with "no knowledge of practical psychotherapy," adding, "all that I know I know from reading books available to everyone." He does not state the source of his knowledge of St. Paul's theology but that can be easily inferred as he was at the time of writing the Assistant Curate in Chislehurst, England. His training for that post had been gained in Cambridge University and it was to the same university he submitted his thesis, for the B.D. degree, before publishing it as *Jung and St. Paul*.

The bibliography is a lengthy one and includes authors from both sides of the Atlantic. Mr. Cox's carefully selected references and their able use throughout the study should impress one with his scholarship. His elaboration on the various issues studied attest to his thoroughness. He seemingly left nothing to chance, but worked his way through almost every possible avenue of investigation. The carefully drawn summaries at the end of each chapter leave little ground for disagreement. This is even more notable when the final chapter, entitled



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"Conclusions," is reached. There he points out that there are clear and distinct parallels between Paul's justification by faith and Jung's Individuation. However, there are differences, too, some apparent and others quite real. These real differences can be stated thus: the way of salvation offered by St. Paul may meet the needs and ability of the common man whereas the solution offered by Jung requires a peculiar ability and much effort to bring man to himself. He makes it quite clear, too, that with all that it has to offer man Analytical Psychology is not Christianity. But at the same time he is ready to insist that God may use the psychoanalyst and his technique to help man attain his best. Just as St. Paul said that the penitent is given righteousness by God, Mr. Cox reminds his readers that Jung says that in the "individuation" which psychotherapy effects something happens which can be understood only by referring to something beyond the bounds of human thought.

Despite the overlapping that he sees between the analytical process and the way of penitence insisted on by St. Paul, Mr. Cox insists that psychology and theology "use two different languages until one has been 'translated' into the other or both have been 'translated' into a third language." In his introductory chapter he develops the idea that both psychotherapy and Christianity are concerned with the same problems. In chapters one, two, and three he discusses justification by faith with its special religious significance and "individuation" with its psychological connotation, separately and in relation to each other. For example, he points out that St. Paul and Jung agree that "natural man" tends to follow his own "conscious devices and desires." Both agree that man should forego his own will. St. Paul then insists that man condemn his own will so that Christ can bring about the desired change in his personality, while Jung says that the new center for man must be

the Self in control, which is the realization of Individuation. Even here it is averred that there is more similarity than difference.

In succeeding chapters other theological and psychological terms are discussed and compared. His conclusion may best be stated by again quoting from the preface: "I do not think that psychotherapy and Christianity are incompatible, but I do think that much that is said by psychotherapists is incompatible with the true Christian faith . . . whereas if psychotherapy and Christianity are to be related in such a way that both are treated with the respect that they deserve the limits of psychotherapy must be borne in mind from the start."

The study is well organized, carefully developed, thoughtfully presented, and stated in such a manner that few readers will need a glossary despite the fact that two highly technical matters are involved. A most helpful list of abbreviations is given just prior to the Introduction and a dual index concludes the book, first the usual kind, a second one for quotations used.

OTIS G. CARNES

*Pembroke State College*

### THE ECUMENICAL MOVEMENT

*Horizons of Christian Community.* By PAUL S. MINEAR. St. Louis: Bethany Press, 1959. 127 pages. \$2.75.

In this book Professor Minear of the New Testament Department at Yale University Divinity School presents his appraisal of the Christian community in terms of the thinking of the New Testament. The five chapters consist of a series of lectures; the first four were delivered as the William Henry Hoover lectures on Christian Unity at the University of Chicago; the last chapter includes sections of the Duddleian Lecture at Harvard Divinity School.

Minear, who has been active in the ecumenical movement, raises the question of

our current image of the church and if it is the same as that which is to be found in the New Testament. To answer the question the New Testament picture of the church must be sought. The author cautions that to look for normative definitions of the Christian community in the New Testament is not productive. "... but if we look for intriguing insights into the distinctive texture of communal relations, we will be bewildered by the multiplicity of such insights" (p. 23). It is stated that the essays are intended for thoughtful Christians who wish to consider the theme and to include in their study their own reading of the New Testament and their experiences within the Christian congregation. The vocabulary of "doxological," "mythological," and "typological" is interpreted, but the book would appear to require a lay student familiar with biblical and theological scholarship to avoid bewilderment. However, to view the horizons of the New

Testament community through the eyes of this New Testament scholar is provocative.

The horizons scanned begin with the church as "mystery," which is explored in terms of the "glory" of God. Recognizing the inability to define precisely God's glory a study on the New Testament references focuses upon its role in New Testament community life. The church cannot be understood apart from the fullness of God's glory.

The survey of horizons involves Christian mythology because the community contacts heaven and earth. Minear points up the fact that the apostolic descriptions of the church as a fellowship of believers or a congregation of the faithful are accepted with little difficulty. The difficulties emerge as the New Testament church affirms its heavenly origin and destiny. The eschatological life of the church is explored in a chapter devoted to "The Frontier of God's War-

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fare." The church is God's army in the cosmic conflict between God and Satan. The weapons of warfare, the armor of God (from the sixth chapter of Ephesians), and prayer are exhibited. The Lord's Prayer is explored as a "battle prayer" in the language of warfare. The New Testament mythological vision of the church makes "three conclusions quite inescapable" (p. 56). The church has but *one* mission. The unity of the church cannot come "except in terms of the fulfilment of this mission." The unity in mission of God's army is a foretaste of the unity between heaven and earth.

The next New Testament exploration deals with the church as the city of God. This requires an understanding of the mythological form called typology. Having explained typology as "an analogical form of thinking and speaking which focuses attention upon two or more pivotal realities and in so doing apprehends the hidden connection between those realities and their common source" (p. 66) there appears an exposition of biblical typology. John's vision of Jerusalem, Sinai and Mount Zion, the Messiah's return to Jerusalem are discussed. This variety of horizons, suggests the author, will reduce the factors that separate present Christian communities from one another. The use of typology may help us to rediscover "the oneness of the Church as the new Jerusalem and thereby to advance toward a genuine ecumenism in time." Carrying out the eschatological view prevalent in the book, "It follows that this ecumenism in time will accelerate the rediscovery of an ecumenism in space" (p. 79).

All churches, of whatever century, live in the perspective of time defined by God's activity: "what God has done in heaven, what he already has done on earth, and what he is about to do on earth" (p. 84). Here the New Testament imagery involving "in heaven" and "on earth," the messianic woes, and the whence-and-whither are examined

for their meaning for the Christian community.

The last chapter, "The Scope of Christ's Work," focuses between the church "out there" and the one in which a member "belongs" and holds "membership." It indicates sources for the recapturing of the concept of the ministry of the laity, prevalent in the ecumenical resurgence.

This is a book that will be of interest to those desiring a discussion of basic New Testament convictions about the Christian community.

NELLE G. SLATER

*Whittier College*

*If It Be of God.* By PAUL GRISWOLD MACY. St. Louis: Bethany Press, 1960. 192 pages. \$4.00.

It is a pleasure to find a book that so completely meets the aims projected on the dust jacket and in the preface. Dr. Macy states that he knows of no other book in existence that discusses the ecumenical movement in non-technical terms and the reviewer agrees. Specifically, he mentions three aims: to avoid the use of puzzling terms, a concise but historically accurate account and to put into permanent form information that so far has found only transient expression. The organization of the book includes an appendix of 42 pages composed mainly of an ecumenical worship service, some ecumenical affirmations, a list of member churches of the World Council, and a bibliography.

It is clear that the author is aware of the detractors of the World Council of Churches for he does much, directly and indirectly, to meet the calumnies of the ardent opponents of the ecumenical movement as well as the thoughtful reservations of many sympathetic to it. Very recently this reviewer read a serious criticism stating that delegates to World Council meetings are too venerable in age. It is intriguing to read on p. 110 that 302 of the 351 delegates to Amsterdam



disclosed their ages; the average age for the whole Assembly was 55, 63% of the delegates who reported their ages were under 60, 20 under 40 and one under 30. Only 18 were 70 or older. Sufficient is also said about the specific aims of the World Council (e.g. *not* to be a super-church) and other matters such as the relationship to the Russian Orthodox and other churches behind the Iron Curtain to allay the suspicions and fears of the lay reader that some try to exaggerate and exploit. Many readers will undoubtedly be fascinated to read as the author traces the direct relationship between the work of Dwight L. Moody and Archbishop William Temple on pp. 37-38.

The discussion of such sensitive theological factors as unity vs. uniformity, the phrase "... accept the Lord Jesus Christ as God and Saviour," and the specific functions of a World Council of Churches are all too brief to satisfy one theologically sophisticated but more than sufficient to answer the initial questions that arise or ought to arise in the minds of laymen and college and/or seminary students developing an interest in the ecumenical movement.

Within the material that is of necessity somewhat cut and dried, Dr. Macy has included many personal vignettes, all related to the material he is covering at the time, as well as an exciting account of the work done by World Council workers during the Second World War. On what would be p. 192 is listed "The Ecumenical Tree" which in diagram form shows the various movements that over the years combined to bring into existence the World Council of Churches. This chart should be helpful for initiates into such apparently confusing terms as Life and Work, Faith and Order, etc. for it not only lists the conferences chronologically but shows their interrelatedness. Inside the back cover is a schematic presentation of the structure and program of the World Council which can also be of

much use in helping the reader integrate what he has read in the text. Unfortunately, neither of these two diagrams is listed in the Table of Contents and the first, especially, can easily be overlooked.

Every conference, organization and personality which contributed significantly to the origin and development of the modern ecumenical movement is mentioned at least in passing and an attempt is made to develop a consistent and comprehensive perspective. The author, whose intimate connection with and knowledge of the movement he writes about is clear, is able to act not only as a chronicler but occasionally presents an evaluation of the importance of the meetings and assemblies under discussion. Such brief, well-placed statements of analysis can be valuable to the person for whom the book was planned and few will disagree with the author's conclusion.

One minor distraction that this reviewer found, particularly in the first half of the book, was the excessive use of quotation marks around words and phrases that do not require them.

The book is a very good one; it is readable, accurate, attractive in format and even the dust jacket is esthetically pleasing. The book is very suitable for college students as collateral reading, for laymen and ministers who need a ready and quick reference for the development of the ecumenical movement in modern times. It should prove appealing as well as informative to those interested in the ecumenical movement and might possibly even interest some who were not previously so inclined. Pastors who find the very nature of the ecumenical movement under attack in their local churches will find this small volume helpful, too. This reviewer hopes that The Bethany Press will advertise the book widely for it is needed and can be of much value in our time.

ANDREW R. EICKHOFF

*Bradley University*

*The Ecumenical Era in Church and Society.*

Edited by EDWARD J. JURJI. New York: Macmillan Company, 1959. ix + 238 pages. \$5.00.

It is certainly a fitting tribute to Dr. John A. Mackay to have a volume in the field of ecumenics dedicated to him as he retires from his work at Princeton Theological Seminary. In this symposium men from some high levels in world-wide Christianity who know and respect Dr. Mackay have contributed chapters.

As is the case in any symposium each author has just a short space in which to develop and express his views; this is not always successful, particularly when the space allotted is so brief and the theme so general. With some noteworthy exceptions in two or three chapters, little new or particularly stimulating is said. Few new insights will result for clergy and professors of religion at all conversant with the ecumenical movement. The unity promised in the preface and title does not appear; much of this undoubtedly is due to the brevity of the chapters.

On the other hand, some chapters present very rewarding reading and leave the reader stimulated and wishing for more. Dr. Eugene Carson Blake in his chapter, "The American Churches and Ecumenical Mission," raises some rather blunt questions concerning the relationship between American and European Churches in the ecumenical movement. In discussing the shift in non-Roman Christian power to the United States, he suggests that non-American Church leaders should learn to understand the creative powers present and learn to use them in an ecumenical strategy for mission rather than "either to lament the preponderance of American dollars or to bewail the limitations of American Christianity." Since all United States denominations represent minority groups without governmental subsidy or status, Dr. Blake suggests that per-

haps they have much more to say about the mission of the Church than the churches in Europe, particularly in respect to churches in Asia, Africa, and Latin-America.

Dr. Blake also attempts to more clearly define the role of leadership that the World Council of Churches must assume if it is to fulfil its ecumenical mission. He points out that this is the only Christian organization in which the younger churches feel the equality of status as full and independent partners (and includes a plea for better financial support for their delegates to attend meetings).

The same critical appraisal is continued later in chapters dealing with Latin-American Evangelical Christianity and renascent Hinduism ("Renascent Religions and Religion"). Dr. Baez-Camargo's discussion gives a detailed historical study of the state of religion in Latin-America since the Roman Catholic entrance and up to but just before the contemporary Protestant growth. Since this is such a significant area for American Protestantism today it is unfortunate that the author stopped short of continuing his excellent analysis to include the present-day scene. In many ways this chapter should be of special importance in this symposium since Dr. Mackay spent twenty years of his life working in Latin America (1916-36) and he and Mrs. Mackay were the first missionaries sent to Latin America by the Free Church of Scotland.

In the chapter on renascent Hinduism we are able to see at first hand many of the issues that are gradually—perhaps sometime in the near future suddenly—forcing the European and American Churches into a re-appraisal of the mission approach, or even the very existence of Christian mission in non-Christian countries. The distinction made between renascent Hinduism and a national Indian community is a vital one though the final effect may well be the same. The clear indications of this chapter are that the time is rapidly approaching when



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all Christian work in non-Christian sections of the world will have to be done by indigenous Christians. The role of the World Council of Churches that Dr. Blake attempts to outline in his earlier chapter is of much more importance in the light of this chapter than in its earlier context.

The final section of the book dealing with "The Message and Its Communication" is a logical one but, again, contains little that is fresh and out of the ordinary.

A brief biographical outline of Dr. Mackay is included at the end of the book plus a list of selected writings of Dr. Mackay in English and Spanish.

All in all, the reviewer feels that although his expectations were not met in many chapters, the book as a whole represents solid thinking in the area of ecumenics. If anything the book suffers from its brevity and high price.

ANDREW R. EICKHOFF

*Bradley University*

### THE BIBLE

*The Enduring Message of the Bible.* By L. HAROLD DEWOLF. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960. 128 pages. \$2.75.

This latest little book by the well-known professor of systematic theology of Boston University School of Theology is an excursion into biblical interpretation. Dr. DeWolf divides his book into three parts: (1) "From God"; (2) "To God"; and (3) "With God." In the first part he discusses the significance of the doctrine of creation which he sees as the answer of biblical man to the question of the whole meaning of human existence. In this connection he interprets the human predicament as estrangement from God as illustrated in the familiar stories of Genesis 1-11. In this part of the book the author also treats the concept of the holiness of God as this is expounded by the writing prophets. The section concludes

with his treatment of man's need for salvation as he shows the biblical interpretation of the basic evil as man's attempt to understand himself and exist without God.

In the second section, "To God," Dr. DeWolf sketches the history of Israel in terms of the *Heilsgeschichte*. Here also in the chapter, "The Word," he deals with Christology, seeing in the life, death, and resurrection of Christ the fulfillment of God's saving purpose. In the chapter, "We Too Shall Be Like Him," the author seems to go quite far in the direction of interpreting the saving power of Jesus as the influence of Jesus' example upon his followers. However, he gives proper weight to the saving significance of Jesus' death with its power to evoke repentance on the part of the believer, with the promise of the believer's own sharing of the resurrection.

In this third section, "With God," the author deals first with the work of the Holy Spirit primarily in the familiar symbolism of the fourth gospel, "the Counselor." In this chapter, in an interesting way, Dr. DeWolf makes clear his view that the Bible, not primarily a book of history or science, sets out to answer man's supreme question: From what source? To what end? How? He shows that the very design of his book is calculated to explore each of these questions successively. Moreover, he makes clear that the biblical and Christian answers to the three basic questions of man lie within the Christian doctrines of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, in short, in the doctrine of the trinity in its fullest exposition.

It was a little difficult for this reviewer to be sure just what kind of book the author was intending to write. He ranges widely throughout both testaments, and gives brief summaries at various points of both Old Testament history and literature and New Testament history and literature. Yet these assume too much knowledge on the part of the reader to qualify the book to be a lay



man's introduction to the Bible. While the book is historical and theological in its development, it is strongly homiletical in tone. This is not intended to be a negative criticism, as he expresses basic biblical themes in some fine passages which are effective in their eloquence. Moreover he illustrates biblical themes with great effectiveness at points out of his recent experiences in Africa. The discussion is illuminated throughout with abundant and effectively selected passages from scripture. In his dealing with New Testament matters this reviewer noted that Dr. DeWolf seems to have a definite predilection for Pauline and Johannine Christianity. The publishers explain that the book arose in part out of the author's recent presentation of the great themes of the Bible in a study series which he conducted for laymen. One can readily observe the warmth and interest with which this study must have been conducted. When all is said and done, however, one wonders how necessary it actually was to have published this material, since other books by specialists in the field of biblical study have perhaps done more effective jobs of writing introductions to the Bible, and to biblical theology. However, no one book ever exhausts the treasure of the Bible, and every man who has insight into the biblical message has a right to make this known. It is certain that many lay readers of Dr. DeWolf's little volume will read it with profit, and many should on the strength of it be stimulated to go further in biblical study.

ROBERT S. ECCLES

*DePauw University*

*The Story of Israel, From Joshua to Alexander the Great.* By STEPHEN SZIKSZAI. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1960. 96 pages. \$1.50.

This is a history of Israel for laymen, although without the companion volumes in the Westminster Guides to the Bible deal-

ing with the pre-Joshua and post-Alexander periods, it is a somewhat truncated history. After a discussion of the literary sources and the meaning of history for the Israelites, the present volume begins with Joshua (when the conquest of Canaan set the "stage where the drama of Israel's life could unfold") and describes five subsequent periods in the history of Israel down to the time of Alexander. The judges, described as charismatic military heroes who led volunteer armies to liberate oppressed countrymen, are replaced by the monarchy whose rapid growth is well described. The following chapter on the divided monarchy is particularly helpful in its evaluation of the counter balance of power between Israel, Judah, Syria, Assyria and Egypt. This section suffers some from the necessary division of labor made by the planners of the Westminster Guides. The prophets, scheduled to be written up in a later volume are missed here where they played a significant part in the political life of the nation. The last two periods covered are the Babylonian captivity and the Persian period.

The treatment is well balanced and inclusive. The dating reflects careful consideration and use of the most recent studies into the problems of dating. At almost no point does the author turn from generally accepted interpretations of the data. Readers of this volume will have before them well-selected, factual material relevant to an introduction to the history of Israel.

At times it might have helped the essay to leave out some of the detailed accounts of the facts (e.g., the attempt to include some information on each of the kings). Instead, more color and background material could be used. This is done in some places. For example, in a few sentences the author throws out a graphic picture of the transition in monarchy from Saul to Solomon against which he is able to work in the details (p. 45). A similar backdrop would have helped the exposition of the various pressures work-

ing against the Israelites in the period of the judges and the significance of the relationship between the Israelite and Canaanite cultus.

There are a few observations of the author that may be questioned. He is perhaps too generous in his valuation of the literature of the period of the judges, which, in his estimation, "reached a new height and brought forth admirable masterpieces . . . among the most superb literary pieces of the world" (p. 35). At another point he states that "the prophetic guilds can be compared in many ways with some modern, extreme Pentecostal sects." These two groups vary greatly in primary function and social acceptability and the value of such comparison is questionable. However, the general tenor of the book is careful in its evaluations. Lay groups studying the history of Israel will find in Dr. Szikszai's book a reliable, brief account of the major events.

ROBERT T. ANDERSON

*Michigan State University*

*The Threshold of Christianity: Between the Testaments.* By LAWRENCE E. TOOMBS. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1960. 96 pages. \$1.50.

The "Westminster Guides to the Bible," of which this small volume is one, is an excellent and growing collection of manuals intended, as the general editor says in his preface, to encourage laymen "to be Biblical scholars." While the expressed purpose may seem somewhat ambitious, it gives unmistakable evidence as to the character of the books. They are not merely pietistic summaries of conventional, unanalyzed information, but attempt honestly to distill the essential conclusions of the best contemporary biblical scholarship into a form which will be intelligible and palatable to the non-specialist reader. The present book splendidly realizes the ideal and should prove useful to a circle even wider than most of the series, since it

deals with a period about which comparatively little has been written, and where the sporadic character of much of the evidence and the difficulty of interpreting the rest leave even the scholar often uncertain of its outline and contours. Prof. Toombs has had to create his own outline, which he has done admirably and, in addition, has filled it out in an easy, colloquial style which is a pleasure to read.

The first two chapters deal with the apocrypha and pseudepigrapha, and with the history of the times. The colorful story of the Hasmonean monarchy is dealt with in somewhat summary fashion, but the author was evidently under severe limitations of space and no doubt made the right choice in reserving his precious pages for a fuller discussion of significant religious ideas. The next two chapters deal with movements and sects which had their origin in this period; particularly valuable is the account of the Dead Sea Community, which is as good a brief article on the subject as will be found anywhere and might well be recommended to lay-people and students who are looking for a concise summary of the main facts about it. Apocalyptic and Messianism are the subjects of the next two chapters, and the book concludes with a sympathetic account of the religious life of Judaism in the inter-testamental period. In this chapter, as elsewhere, the author gives evidence not only of his scholarship but of his personal involvement in the matters with which he deals.

ROBERT C. DENTAN

*General Theological Seminary*

*Bible Key Words.* Vol. II. From Kittel's *Theologisches Wörterbuch*. Translated by J. R. COATES and H. P. KINGDOM. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958. 322 pages. \$4.00.

Vol. I of Kittel's *Bible Key Words* in English appeared in 1951 and it was re-

# New texts

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viewed in this Journal. It was hailed as one of the most important tools for Bible students. Now, Bible students everywhere will welcome this second volume and libraries will not be complete without this book. No one will question that fact that Kittel's *Theologisches Wörterbuch* is a monumental work in the field of biblical study.

This is a one volume edition of four books: Bk. I, *Lord*, by Foerster and Quell; Bk. II, *Gnosis*, by Rudolf Bultmann; Bk. III, *Basileia*, by Schmidt, Kleinenknecht, Kuhn; Bk. IV, *Apostleship*, by Rengstorf. (Vol. I deals with the words: Love, Church, Sin, Righteousness.) Each of these great New Testament words are studied by eminent scholars and their treatment is so thorough and scholarly that few will be able to offer adverse criticism against their views.

The history of each word is traced back to its earliest period. The etymology and derivatives of each word are carefully studied. All the authors follow more or less the same pattern of study. They begin with the period of classical Greek and then come down to the Hellenistic period, and then to later Judaism and to the New Testament.

Some one hundred pages have been devoted to the study of the word *Kurios* (Lord) alone. In classical Greek, *Kurios* was used as a title for gods and rulers, but in the Septuagint it is used as the title of the only true God, Yahweh, and it is so used 6,156 times in the LXX alone. In the New Testament the word is not only used with reference to God, but also to the risen Jesus.

Bultmann's exhaustive study of *Gnosis* (knowledge) is very illuminating. *Gnosis* meant two things: the act of knowing and knowledge itself. *Gnosis* does not mean knowledge of science (*episteme*), but knowledge of God. To the Gnostics, *Gnosis* was a gift from God; it was illumination different from rational thought; man cannot have access to God in his natural state. Gnosticism demands faith and prayer rather than hard

thinking. It is characterized by ecstatic and mystic vision. It is knowledge of the soul's whence and whither. *Gnosis* is a form of piety and ignorance (*agnoia*); *agnosis* is not only lack of knowledge, but also wickedness (pp. 9-12). Bultmann is convinced that the influence of Gnosticism is evident in the New Testament, especially in the Gospel of John and in the Pauline Epistles.

Book III is composed of the contributions of four authors. The word *Basileia* (Kingdom) is studied from every possible angle. Among the Jews the name of God was carefully avoided and the word Heaven (*Shamayim*) was used. The expression, *Malkuth Shamayim* (Kingdom of Heaven) is consistently used in the Rabbinic literature. The expression, *basileia tou theou* (Kingdom of God), as used by Mark and Luke, is an accurate translation, but *basileia ton ouranon*, as used by Matthew, is a slavish one (p. 16). It should be noted that *Malkuth Shamayim* can never mean the "Kingdom of God" in the sense of the territory ruled over by Him. The expression simply describes the fact that God is king or kingship (p. 16).

The expression, the Kingdom of Heaven, is found only in Matthew, except perhaps in John 3:5. But Matthew also has the expression, the Kingdom of God, in 12:28, 21:31, 43; 6:3. Did Matthew use these two expressions interchangeably or did he try to make any distinction between them? We shall never know. Which of these two did Jesus use in the original Aramaic? We do not know. But we may assume that the Kingdom of Heaven may have had reference to a specific power coming from heaven resulting in the establishment of God's reign upon earth. Thus the kingdom (*basileia*) originally meant sway, not realm. The second thought implied in the expression is that the kingdom of God is a gift from God and the kingdom is not man's achievement, but is a result of God's intervention (p. 38).

The word *Apostolos* (apostle) occurs 79



times in the New Testament. The usage of this word in the NT is quite unique and one may not find parallels in other Greek literature. The word as used in the NT never means the act of sending, but it is always the designation of a man who is sent as ambassador, and indeed, as an authorized ambassador (p. 25). The "Disciples" constitute the larger community. The word "Disciples" includes the "Apostles." Every apostle is a disciple, but every disciple could not be an apostle. The apostle is the one who proclaims the coming and nearness of the Kingdom of God and such proclamation is limited to a certain period (p. 33).

An apostle is the one who has met the Risen Lord and he is the one who has received a personal commission from Jesus. The Twelve were the first to receive such a commission. Apostleship seems to imply two things at least. The apostles are those who have received authoritative appointment to be his representatives in the Christian community. In a changed situation they also became missionaries and "it was this part of their work which gave its stamp to their office" (p. 43).

DAVID K. W. KIM

*Boston University*

*The Book of Hosea . . . Joel . . . Amos . . . Obadiah . . . Jonah.* By JACOB M. MYERS (The Layman's Bible Commentary, edited by Balmer H. Kelly *et al.*, vol. 14). Richmond: John Knox Press, 1959. 176 pages. \$2.00.

To review this book I have perused no less than five recent commentary sets, all of the handbook type; four of the five are aimed at the lay reader, the fifth is for the lesser trained minister. Two of these sets are coming out in England; one is appearing in the U. S.; and two are being published in both countries. While three are on the entire Bible, two are on the New Testament.

Who will read them all? Don't worry; they would not be published by reputable concerns (as they are) were there no demand. They are prime evidence of the increased interest in the study of the Bible by laymen; and all of them will be used.

The Layman's Bible Commentary series will consist of twenty-five volumes when completed (two were reviewed in the July issue of this periodical), and will be finished about 1964. Done by competent scholars, mostly Presbyterians (Myers is an exception, representing sound Lutheran learning), they are "designed to be a concise non-technical guide for the layman in personal study of his own Bible" (Preface). Reasonably priced (\$2 each, any four for \$1.75 each), they are within the means of the average member of a Bible study group today.

The volume on Hosea, Joel, Amos, Obadiah, and Micah is a fine example of the excellence of the series. Jacob M. Myers is Professor of Old Testament at Lutheran Theological Seminary in Gettysburg, Pa., and did the Introduction and Exegesis of Judges in the Interpreter's Bible.

First we shall speak concretely of the treatment of the five biblical books; then some general observations will follow. Myers' work is capable, clear, and stimulating. The style is good; there is, here and there, a clear-cut definition of some biblical term that is not easy to put into words. And the reader is not left in the B.C. centuries, but is brought face to face, now and again, with the present day situation by means of a brief suggestion. "Go to church and sin," and "reads like the report of a marriage counselor," give the idea of the type of memorable phrase found in certain sections.

The part on Hosea is quite full, considering the size of the work. It follows the usual interpretation, but is freshly presented. The exegesis of chapter 11 presents the love of Yahweh admirably.

Joel is placed early (before 516). The

locust flight of 1889 with its nearly 25,000,000,000 insects makes the account vivid.

In Amos, the somewhat conservative point of view shows itself when the last five verses of the book are regarded as quite possibly genuine. Thus the prophet becomes one of decided hope. And how do we know Amos was old (p. 123)? Then, too, should not Caphtor be located for the layman (p. 147)?

Obadiah becomes more than a hymn of hate, and has a message for today.

The treatment of Jonah, which will not get bogged down in tangential questions so that the main message is missed, is the kind we wish many a layman had read when first studying this part of the Bible. The book is treated as a parable, perhaps a sermon. The power of the preaching represented here is thus preserved without needless arguments.

But why identify the leading character with the Jonah of 2 Kings 14:25 when the messages are completely different? The author of the book is using a (then) very acceptable literary device in utilizing a well-known name.

There should be at least one historical chart and one map. A bibliography would aid the reader who wants to go further; it should surely include not only the standard aids but the very pungent translations in the series "Books of the Old Testament in Colloquial Speech" edited by G. Currie Martin and T. H. Robinson and published so reasonably by the National Adult School Union, 35 Queen Anne St., London W. 1.

As in the case of the larger commentary sets, it is better to buy individual volumes according to excellence than to take a whole set. Let us also remember that a handbook-size commentary is good for a lay person, but that it is not adequate for the seminary-trained minister. Yet seminary-trained men should know what sets to recommend to their lay people.

Finally, never before have there been so

many competent, useful helps for the laity in understanding the Bible. Let us see that they are used.

JOHN H. SCAMMON  
*Andover Newton Theological School*

*Forerunners of Jesus.* By LEROY WATERMAN. New York: Philosophical Library, 1959. xii + 156 pages, n.p.

When a competent scholar publishes one anticipates informative reading material, and this book is packed with information. Leroy Waterman, Professor Emeritus of Near Eastern Studies at the University of Michigan, seeks to demonstrate how Christianity developed out of Judaism, and to indicate those biblical personalities who might be called "forerunners of Jesus."

The opening chapter, "Protestantism and the Authority of the Bible," provides an excellent digest of the familiar evolutionary scheme of Old Testament religion from polytheism through henotheism to the ethical monotheism of Deutero-Isaiah, but barely touches on the problem of the authority of the Old Testament. In discussing New Testament authority the author points out that four levels of religious expression are to be found in the New Testament. The first is "animistic," and ascribes to Jesus belief in, and control over, demonic forces causing illness and mental derangement. The second is "nationalistic," depicting Jesus as the Jewish Messiah. The third stratum involves belief in "apocalyptic supernaturalism" and "blood-atonement." None of these, Dr. Waterman believes, represent the religion of Jesus which is to be found in the fourth level—that involving ethical monotheism. It is in the high religion of Jesus that the authority of the New Testament is to be discerned. The discussion by Dr. Waterman seems shallow in view of the extensive studies of biblical authority by scholars in America and Europe.

The author turns to a consideration of the

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"forerunners" of Jesus, of whom the unknown author of II Isaiah is deemed to be the most important. The seventy-two pages of Chapter II, which are given largely to a discussion of Deutero-Isaiah, are among the best in the book, for it is here that the author's rich background in Near Eastern culture becomes apparent. One wishes that Dr. Waterman had expanded this section further to include more detailed discussion of the Akitu festival against which much of Deutero-Isaiah must be studied. The unique contributions to the development of religion which II Isaiah made are, according to the author: ethical monotheism, faith in a universal deity, the mission of redemption by Israel, the servant. Dr. Waterman solves the problem of the identity of the servant in the various passages by suggesting that in some instances the prophet is referring to himself (49:5a), and in other places to Israel or some group within Israel (50:10-11).

The motif of the suffering servant is based upon Jeremiah, Dr. Waterman believes, but he encounters considerable difficulty in making the pattern fit. For example, in discussing Isaiah 53:10b, the author pictures the prophet telling the exiles that when they experience that sense of guilt which made Jeremiah's life "seem to have been a guilt-offering, an offering, that is, brought about by the nation's guilt, you will then realize that his was the only kind of a life as God's servant that can be most pleasing to God. And at that point the servant spirit that was in him will live again and come to light in you and thus prolong his (the servant's) days" (p. 73). This sort of isogesis is anything but convincing!

The only Old Testament writer who accepted the message of Deutero-Isaiah was the author of Jonah. Jonah is interpreted as an allegory on the Babylonian Exile in which the Jews were "swallowed." The shade-plant becomes a symbol of the ephemeral hope of a Messiah, the mission to Nine-

veh an expression of the belief that even the worst men will repent if given a chance.

It is Jesus who adopts and applies "the theory of God, man and the world" which had been propounded by II Isaiah. In the application of this religion Jesus universalizes "all human relations on an ethical basis of justice and law" (p. 107). To substantiate Jesus' relationship to the ethical prophets Waterman points out that Jesus twice quotes Hosea 6:6, "I desire steadfast love and not sacrifice" (Matt. 9:3, 12:7). No attempt is made to demonstrate how it can be known that this doublet actually contains Jesus' words, rather than those ascribed to him by the author of Matthew at a time when the Temple had been destroyed and sacrifice was no longer possible. It should be pointed out that Rabbi ben Zakkai, in the same period when Matthew is believed to have been written, used this same citation from Hosea to give direction to the new Judaism developing in that troublous era.

John the Baptist is also listed among the forerunners of Jesus, and John's relationship to the Qumran community is discussed. When Dr. Waterman describes the significance of the Qumran material in terms of providing "a new setting and background" for the understanding of John, he is on solid ground. When he attempts to develop, as others have done, the highly speculative hypothesis that John may have been a member of the Qumran community, he moves into the realm of "the might-have-been" and adds but little to the weight of his discussion. Jesus is depicted as a disciple of John who repudiates his master's asceticism, rite of baptism, and apocalyptic message, preferring to follow the ethical teachings of the prophets.

Dr. Waterman tends to develop his thesis by ignoring the points of view of other scholars. For example, the work of the *Formgeschichtliche Schule* must be taken into consideration when attempting to de-



termine the authentic sayings of Jesus. The problems involved in the use of Jeremiah as the pattern for the suffering servant passages have been discussed by S. A. Cook and W. F. Lofthouse, but their work is ignored. Nor are the arguments for particularism in II Isaiah as developed by Norman Snaith, and others, considered. An argument presented without regard for other points of view is sure to appear neatly packaged, but is open to criticism. Dr. Waterman's book contains many valuable insights which one would expect from a scholar of his caliber, but his thesis is vulnerable.

GERALD A. LARUE

*University of Southern California*

*Teaching the New Testament.* By EDNA M. BAXTER. Philadelphia: Christian Education Press, 1960. 307 pages. \$4.95.

There is always a demand for books that will encourage a creative teaching of Bible truths. Dr. Baxter in her new book urges a fresh look at the New Testament with the hope that its message may come alive through the use of good methods of study and activity for both teacher and pupil.

As former head of the department of religious education at the Hartford Theological Seminary Foundation, Dr. Edna M. Baxter has taught and supervised graduate students in field work for over twenty-five years. From these endeavors she has gathered some of the finest examples of good teaching as related to the New Testament and through the pages of her book has shared them with us. For those who wish additional resources, a bibliography of books, films, and filmstrips can be found in the final pages.

Part One of the book is a survey of the content of the New Testament. In thirteen brief chapters of vivid prose, Dr. Baxter reminds us "How the New Testament Came To Be." While this material has been covered more adequately and in a more schol-

arly fashion by numerous other books, for teachers of the New Testament in our church schools this section offers a good review of the source material at their fingertips.

For many readers, however, the greatest contribution of the book is found in Part Two, where the author gets into the purpose as found in the book's title. "Special Ways to Teach the New Testament" is a varied collection of procedures for use in teaching children and youth in the church school. To make the teaching even more practical, Dr. Baxter specifies the age level and general abilities of the group with which the method is being employed.

The first section of Part Two takes the form of a 12-session unit of study for young people, based on the content material given in the earlier survey section on the New Testament. Here Dr. Baxter unifies the New Testament teachings into a concentrated study, which makes use of cooperative planning on the part of the teacher and his pupils. The result is a synthesis of research, creative writing, dramatic impersonations of the First Century Christians, use of maps and pictures, preparation of murals and slides, and some quizzes to review the learning. For the church school teacher who would like an outlined step-by-step procedure for doing this kind of creative teaching, the section is very helpful.

There follow some interesting experiments in Bible study. A group of 8th and 9th graders prepare a drama on their findings on the life of Jesus. Another group of junior boys and girls investigate the Jewish festivals of Jesus' day and of modern times. Still another class used puppets to tell a story, wrote original poems, stories, or newspaper advertisements and articles from the stimulation of the New Testament studies. Home work in the form of supplementary reading in the family is encouraged with good results.

Only minimal attention is given by Dr. Baxter to the younger children. They are shown learning about Jesus through the use of pictures, stories, songs, conversation, and the celebration of Christmas. The resources offered for use with these younger children are briefly related to the ability and understanding level of each department.

A final section on the interpretation of Easter in the church school is helpful, but not detailed nor inclusive enough for the teacher who must face this task each year. Dr. Baxter states the problem when she says that the teaching usually takes one of two extreme points of view: 1) a strict adherence to biblical fact in telling the story, or 2) a stress on new life in the spring to parallel the reawakening of nature and man's survival after death. She says that for the younger children, who have such limitations in time and space concepts, Easter is seen in the "growth, life and death in plant and animal life." For older children and youth the consecutive story from the Bible should be taught. As an additional resource, the appendix of the book contains an article by Alexander C. Purdy, Professor of New Testament Exegesis at Hartford Seminary Foundation, on "Interpreting the Easter Message in the Church School."

The church school teacher who reads Dr. Baxter's book will undoubtedly wish that she had given her full 300-page energy to the challenge of teaching the New Testament, and had omitted altogether the first part on its content. However, in stating a double purpose for this first section of her book (i.e., "... background material for teachers, and as a reading material for young people"), Dr. Baxter places herself in something of a dilemma.

There are also dangers inherent in the author's obvious assumption that the church school teachers understand the philosophy behind the good teaching methods she cites. In omitting such undergirding motivation,

which is necessary to produce the environment from which comes the miracle of good teaching and learning, Dr. Baxter has encouraged an abuse of her book. Some readers will find it all too easy to make use of the interesting *results* of the good teaching methods found in the book, as mere program *resources*, without sensing the need to go through the creative processes with their own pupils in their own class situations.

ROSALIE V. JENKINS

Graduate Student  
Boston University

### SYMBOLISM

*Symbolism in the Bible and the Church.* By GILBERT COPE. New York: Philosophical Library, 1959. 287 pages. \$10.00.

They are a brave clan who attempt, as does Gilbert Cope in this book, to demonstrate "... that the imagery and symbolism of the Bible and Church are valid and effective still ..." (p. 12). For such a remythologizing, while necessary if not inevitable, is bound to satisfy few of the contemporaries on whose behalf it is attempted.


For one thing, these contemporaries are sensitive of their individuality and resent being lumped into massive generalizations like "modern man" (see e.g., p. 74). Of course, if the author doesn't so generalize, his alternative is so many mythologies that the latter situation is worse than the first. But this fact doesn't stop the historian from feeling that extremely complex processes are presented as offensively simple. For example,

With the dangers of idolatry in mind, Christian art thus became non-naturalistic, formal and deliberately primitive in style ... (p. 44; cf. p. 161).

Then, too, the remythologizer has to dive boldly into the depths of subjective interpretation, especially if he feels with Cope that the continuing relevance of biblical symbol-

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ism is best seen in the light of C. J. Jung's theory of archetypal symbols of the unconscious. The scholar stands on (what he hopes is) the shore screaming "Where are the controls! Where's the evidence?"

He is especially piqued when a Cope complains of a kind of neo-typological biblicism:

This kind of interpretation has the advantage of enabling those who practice it to show that anything in the Scriptures can mean anything else. . . . The dialectical ingenuity [of Austin Farrer] in itself gives rise to the suspicion that perhaps something is being done with mirrors . . . (pp. 90-91).

"Well!" says he, in a fine dander, "who could match the ad lib exegesis of these samples?" (as he lifts slightly out of context a few especially extreme passages):

Jesus moves on the face of the Galilean waters, and thus symbolizes the power of the human psyche in full consciousness and its control of the mysterious depths of the unconscious. Here is another way of thinking of his 'perfection' (p. 93).

The throne itself [in the New Year enthronement festivals] is a symbol of the Great Mother, and the enthroning really signifies the new birth which (in the ancient ritual) follows the king's vicarious humiliation and death—he is annually reborn as the son of the virgin-earth-mother (p. 156).

The cult of the Christmas tree is popular because the unconscious 'recognizes' a mystery of life and knowledge signified by a tree . . . (p. 173).

Nevertheless, Cope and his fellows are to be congratulated. Every college teacher of religion knows how much of his labor is devoted to trying to translate ancient materials into modern language and thought forms. Doubtless no particular translation will please all or even many. But the effort is worthy if, like Cope's, it turns one's attention to rethinking for oneself fresh possibilities in the Bible and the church's worship forms. Because of the impressive range of his learning and the even more impressive range of his sensibility Cope passes this test easily.

One might feel that he would have

strengthened his work by offering a little more deliberate discussion of his methodology and some recognition of its limitations. He could have tightened the structure and given early guides to his architectonic. A little more documentation (e.g., on pages 37, 46, 56, 62, 102, 188, 189, 250) would have been welcome. Much more important, one wishes he could have given as much attention to the post-Darwinian and post-Einsteinian aspects of the modern world as he did to the post-Freudian.

On the other hand, the work as it stands, perhaps in part because of its diffuse character, embodies the author's message better than some others' works of greater precision. The power of symbolism is that it mediates without straining out ambiguities and paradoxes. It is well for a book designed to vitalize one's sensitivity to symbols not to deal with them in such a way that the reader feels it is too bad they can't be supplanted by straightforward exposition. There is some point to the comment of the vexed painter that if he could tell in words the "meaning" of his painting, there would have been no justification for painting it.

Finally, a word of appreciation is in order for Cope's felicity of expression and his pungent wit as well as his generous attitude toward those who differ. In view of the impossibility of the task attempted, this work is no inconsiderable achievement. Moreover, it is enjoyable reading.

CURTIS W. R. LARSON

*Queens College*

#### IN MEMORY OF JOACHIM WACH

*The History of Religions: Essays in Methodology.* Edited by MIRCEA ELIADE and JOSEPH M. KITAGAWA. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959. xii + 100 pages. \$5.00.

These eight essays in memory of Joachim Wach can well serve as an introduction to



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the discipline of the history of religions. The novice who finds himself bewildered by the complexities and the very mass of the field can here find a guide which will lead him into the stream of developments and offer him a perspective on basic issues. For the more advanced student of the subject it is a compendium of important positions with many valuable suggestions for further consideration.

These essays have as their basic purpose to further the development of the history of religions as a field of study which is seeking to formulate a clear methodology and to set practical limits to its domain. The volume represents a solid contribution to these ends and the promise in Dean Brauer's Preface that the Chicago Press intends to issue further works in this area is good news.

The first chapter, by Professor Kitagawa, traces "The History of Religions in America" as an academic discipline. It is an excellent apology for the subject as an essential part of the liberal arts curriculum and presents a lucid summary of the growth of this field of study, offering some clear signposts for future development.

Professor W. C. Smith of McGill University continues with "Comparative Religions: Whither—and Why?" He shows how the history of religions has moved from a first stage wherein the stress was upon the accumulation of impersonal data into a second stage where it became obvious that actual people were involved in these religions of Asia and Africa. Now we are moving into the third stage in which the commitment of both the observer and the observed are seen to be central. To think in terms of "committed scholarship" should no longer be regarded as anomalous but rather as a necessary requirement to understanding.


The Italian scholar, Dr. Pettazzoni, has contributed a short treatise on his favorite theme, "The Supreme Being: Phenomenological Structure and Historical Develop-

ment," in which he stresses that man's "notion of a Supreme Being springs from man's existential needs." Professor Jean Daniélou of the Catholic Institute of Paris next discusses phenomenology and philosophy of religion in relation to the thought of Henry Duméry, arguing that man's religions represent recognition of the "successive forms of one reality," conceding, however, that the normative questions of the locus of this reality remains to be answered.

Professor Eliade's contribution, "Methodological Remarks on the Study of Religious Symbolism," is a good introduction to his school of thought which has its roots in Jungian psychology. He stresses the possibility, in fact, the necessity of having a point of view in the midst of the jungle of data, and states that "one is a historian of religions not by virtue of mastering a certain number of philologies, but because one is able to integrate religious data into a general perspective."

I pass over the seven page chapter of the French Islamics scholar, Louis Massignon, with the hope that his failure to communicate his "Notion of the 'Real Elite'" to me was due either to my own human limitations or to the physical limitations of his article. Professor Ernst Benz of the University of Marburg has a thoughtful and helpful discussion "On Understanding Non-Christian Religions." His presentation of the kind of pitfalls into which a Christian or a western interpreter can stumble should be required reading for every teacher of the history of religions.

The anchor man is Friedrich Heiler who has much to say about the "modern science of religion," but who illustrates on every page his dependence upon a few unexamined axioms which obviate any real claim to follow a genuine *Religionswissenschaft*. It is unfortunate that this essay was placed last since it appeals to the natural prejudice of men to seek unity and harmony rather than



## The Keystone in the Citadel of God

*"Someone has said that everything is in the Bible. Yes, everything essential for the conduct of life in amity is there. But what is most precious is the proper understanding of the term 'justice', for it is the keystone in the citadel of God, which unites man to his creator."*

In this introductory paragraph, Francis Neilson reveals the abiding belief that emerges from a lifetime of research and reflection.

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**Dr. E. G. Swem**, *Librarian Emeritus, William and Mary College, Va.*: "I hope the book will reach many like myself, and become a sustaining force in our modern philosophy."

**The Very Rev. F. W. Dillistone, D. D.**, *Dean of Liverpool Cathedral*: "What a marvellous achievement it is. I noted especially . . . your emphasis on the permanent power of myths, your fine interpretations of Amos and Isaiah, your understanding as a dramatist of the drama of Job."

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to wrestle with the problems of human diversity which exist in so many areas of life. What we really are offered is a sermon on a text from Schleiermacher: "The deeper one progresses in religion, the more the whole religious world appears as an indivisible whole." He begins with a reference which unfortunately misapplies Malachi 2:10, "Have we not all one father?," which long since has been shown to refer to the Jew as opposed to the gentile. His common denominator for all religions is that of a "divine essence" or "divine absolute" recognized and known by mystics of all ages and religions. This "truth" is proclaimed with evangelical fervor and much "evidence" is adduced to support it. But what is lacking is a truly scientific methodology, and one is left with the question: "If all religions really are the same at base what difference does it make

what anyone believes?" If this essay had been placed first rather than last it is probable that one would lay down this volume with a different feeling about the nature of *Religionswissenschaft*.

But if Christian scholars can be as disparate as Barth, Toynbee, and Wieman, the amazing fact is how much agreement exists between scholars in the field of the history of religions. Perhaps this is due in part to the legacy of biblical scholarship which has set the pace for so much of the study of religious literature and movements. In any event these essays in methodology by a galaxy of western scholars is a worthy and lasting memorial to the contributions of Professor Wach.

DAVID G. BRADLEY

Duke University

From UR to NABARETH

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## Books Received

(Books marked with an \* are hereby acknowledged. Others will be reviewed in this or subsequent issues of the Journal.)

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- \*Thompson, Betty, *Turning World*. New York: Friendship Press, 1960. 128 pages. \$1.50, paperback; \$2.95, cloth.
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